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MISREADING THE WILLIAMS ACTt 
Lyman Johnson* and David Millon** 
The Commission does not believe that any bill should be adopted which 
would either encourage or discourage takeover bids, nor does the Com-
mission want to be involved in any way in passing upon the merits or 
conditioning the terms of takeover bids. 
- Manuel F. Cohen, Chairman of the SEC, 
during Senate committee hearings on 
the proposed Williams Act, 1967.I 
[T]he [C]ommission has instructed us to support challenges to the 
constitutionality of the Delaware [antitakeover] statute .... I identified 
that as a top priority because our success or failure in those challenges 
will have a far[-]reaching effect on tender offer practice and quite likely 
on what Congress does with respect to tender offer legislation. 
- Daniel Goelzer, General Counsel of the 
SEC, July 22, 1988.2 
INTRODUCTION 
Prompted by the sharply rising tide of hostile takeover activity, 
and fearing its disruptive effects on their economies, most states have 
enacted legislation to regulate takeover contests. 3 Because Delaware's 
recent statute4 alone governs approximately one half of all New York 
Stock Exchange-listed companies, the vast majority of public corpora-
tions are protected by state legislation. While state takeover statutes 
assume several different forms, all recent legislation shares a common 
t Copyright© 1989, by Lyman Johnson and David Millon. 
* Associate Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law. B.A. 1973, 
Carleton College; J.D. 1978, University of Minnesota. - Ed. 
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1. Full Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership and in Corporate Takeover Bids: Hearings 
on S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 178 (1967) [h'ereinafter Senate Hearings]. 
2. Special Report, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1176 (July 22, 1988) (interview transcript). 
3. According to a recent survey, since 1982 at least 29 states have adopted one or more of the 
various forms of takeover laws. See Grippo, In Defense of State Takeover Laws, 8 N. ILL. L. 
REV. 273, 273-74 n.4 (1988). States continue to act in this area. See Lipman, Another Genera-
tion of Antitakeover Laws Beginning to Develop, Natl. L.J., Feb. 20, 1989, at SIS. 
4. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (1974 & Supp. 1988). 
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purpose. It aims to discourage hostile takeover attempts by placing 
various obstacles - such as required target management approval and 
the resulting delay, uncertainty, and increased costs - in the path of 
takeover bids. Although often shrouded in the rhetoric of shareholder 
welfare, the primary goal of these laws is to protect various non-
shareholder interests thought to be adversely affected by hostile take-
over activity.5 State legislators are particularly concerned about the 
increasingly typical "bust-up" takeover, in which the bidder seeks to 
profit from large-scale asset liquidations or corporate restructurings 
that result in plant closings, employee lay offs, and out-of-state reloca-
tions. 6 Takeovers motivated by such objectives are believed to 
threaten jobs, established customer and supplier relationships, tax rev-
enues, charitable contributions, and other economic and social benefits 
provided by resident companies to local communities.7 Together with 
the threat to incumbent corporate managements, 8 these concerns have 
5. See Johnson, Corporate Takeovers and Corporations: Who Are They For?, 43 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 781, 783 n.11 (1986): 
There are, of course, a great variety of concerns about the effects of takeover activity -
actual and threatened - on persons and groups other than shareholders. One way to clas-
sify many of these misgivings is to separate a concern for the effects on persons whose lives 
are immediately affected by a particular corporation from concerns that are more national in 
scope. "Stakeholders" in specific corporations such as employees, suppliers, creditors, cus-
tomers, and local enterprise-dependent communities fall within the former category. Diver-
sion of credit to unproductive uses, narrow management focus on short-run economic 
performance, inordinate use of debt, and waste of society's resources are oft-cited concerns 
about takeovers that fall within the latter category. Obviously, the distinction is somewhat 
artifical since many corporate activities affect both categories. Nonetheless, it serves as a 
reminder that while there are many persons and groups interested in the fate of individual 
corporations, there is also a larger societal concern about the cumulative effects of takeover 
activity. 
In this Article, the term "nonshareholder" is used to refer to both kinds of nonshareholder 
interests. 
6. The "bust-up" motivation, rather than a desire to increase efficiency by replacing manage-
ment, is now the dominant motivation for hostile takeovers. Coffee, Shareholders Versus Manag-
ers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1, 2-7 (1986). This development has 
been linked to certain characteristics of the present business environment - termed "the age of 
finance.corporatism" - that stress short-term maximization of investment returns. See Lipton, 
Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 5-6 (1987). 
7. See A. SCHLIEFER & L. SUMMERS, HOSTILE TAKEOVERS AS BREACHES OF TRUST (Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 2342, 1987) (arguing that shareholder 
gains in "bust-up" takeovers result from breaches of implicit contracts between shareholders and 
stakeholders); CoFFEE, The Uncertain Case for Takeover Reform: An Essay on Stockholders, 
Stakeholders and Bust-Ups, 1988 WIS. L. REv. 435; Lipton, supra note 6, at 1, 25-26. For partic-
ular examples, see Nussbaum & Dobrzynski, The Battle For Corporate Control, Bus. WK.,.May 
18, 1987, at 102, 103; Sheets, People Pay the Highest Price in a Takeover, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REP., July 22, 1985, at 51. 
8. Professor Romano has argued that protection of incumbent management is the real reason 
behind state antitakeover legislation, citing the leading role played by the Aetna Life and Casu-
alty Insurance Company and the Connecticut Business and Industry Association in the passage 
of Connecticut's statute. Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REv. 
111, 122 (1987). Her argument minimizes the possible significance of evidence of organized la-
bor's support for takeover legislation in other states. See id. at 137-38. Furthermore, in Con-
necticut itself, labor was on record as supporting plant-closing legislation. Id. at 134 n.58. 
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occupied the legislators' attention as they respond to heightened take-
over activity. Thus, for obvious economic and political reasons, deter-
rence of tender offers, not "investor protection," is emerging as the 
states' principal motivation in passing takeover laws, a fact state legis-
lators are beginning to acknowledge more candidly.9 
While perceived by state legislators to damage nonshareholders, 
tender offers have been hailed by several sources as a godsend for 
shareholders. Over the past two decades, the hostile takeover has re-
placed the proxy fight as the more potent vehicle for wresting corpo-
rate control from incumbent management. Thus the takeover 
provides a critical market-based mechanism for assuring better man-
agement accountability to shareholders. 10 In this respect, hostile take-
over attempts not only enhance shareholder wealth in the short run, 11 
they also play an important role in redressing the "internal" imbalance 
of power between managers and shareholders that exists in the con-
temporary state law-created corporate governance scheme. To accom-
plish these laudable purposes, the would-be acquirer does nothing 
more than appeal directly to the target company's shareholders to sell 
their stock at a price substantially over market price. Thus, while hav-
ing an obvious connection to "internal," state-established corporate 
relationships, tender offers circumvent the pro-management tilt of that 
regime. They do so by operating through the medium of the "exter-
nal" nationwide securities markets and by being directed to only one 
party in the governance scheme - the shareholder. 
This shareholder-centered perspective on tender offers is accurate 
as far as it goes, but control over corporate assets, not shareholder 
stock, is the bidder's ultimate goal. It is the aftermath of a stock ac-
quisition that is of concern to the corporate entity and its entire field of 
constituent relationships. The purchase of stock from shareholders is 
Although labor took no active role in enactment of the antitakeover law, legislators who assumed 
a connection between hostile takeovers and plant closings may have taken for granted labor's 
position on the takeover question. Romano also makes no effort to explain language from other 
state statutes expressly referring to a broad range of nonshareholder interests. See infra notes 69 
& 78. Finally, the equation of management support with selfish entrenchment objectives may be 
questionable; many corporate managers would dispute the suggestion that their desire to keep 
their jobs is motivated by narrow self-interest rather than by a genuine concern for the welfare of 
a broad range of constituencies whose lives are affected by corporate activity. See Bryan, The 
Corporation and the Executive in the Community, 1987 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 695 (lecture by 
Chairman and CEO of Sara Lee Corporation). 
9. See infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text. 
10. See, e.g., Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of 
the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 CoLUM. L. REV. 1145 (1984); Easterbrook 
& Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. 
L. REV. 1161 (1981). 
11. Premiums average 30% to 40% over market price. Jensen & Ruback, The Market for 
Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN. EcoN. 5 (1983). 
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simply the means to achieve other objectives that implicate a diverse 
array of nonshareholder interests. Consequently, as states seek to pro-
tect local enterprise-dependent economic interests by curbing takeover 
activity, they emphasize the hostile takeover's significance as a "corpo-
rate" rather than a purely "shareholder" or capital market matter. 
Therefore, as with mergers, substantial asset sales, dissolutions, or 
other fundamental changes in corporate structure, takeovers are seen 
properly to lie within the traditional sphere of state corporation law, 
and are regarded as appropriate subjects for regulation through the 
general corporation statute. In short, recognizing the potential impact 
of tender offers on local constituent interests, and thus on their econo-
mies, states have sought to reclaim primary authority over this capital 
market phenomenon by "corporatizing" the law of takeovers. 12 This 
is necessarily done at the price of denying shareholders the wealth and 
governance benefits of takeovers. 13 Thus, while takeovers are touted 
as a powerful antidote for the longstanding governance ills of state 
corporation law, statutory counter-measures jeopardize their potency. 
As states pursue their "corporatization" strategy by passing in-
creasingly robust antitakeover laws, their efforts are being challenged 
by the Securities and E_xchange Commission with its simpler, share-
holder-oriented capital market perspective on tender offers. The SEC 
denies that tender offers are accurately characterized as "corporate" 
matters: Instead, the SEC emphasizes that tender offers involve the 
sale and purchase of stock and therefore are best described as securi-
ties transactions. The SEC and other critics argue that state antitake-
over legislation has intruded into an area properly subject to federal 
regulation, that is, the fair and efficient functioning of the national 
capital markets. 14 By insisting that the Williams Act, 15 which regu-
lates limited aspects of tender offers, embodies a pervasive federal 
takeover policy that precludes state interference, the SEC reads the 
Williams Act as "federalizing" or "securitizing" tender offer regula-
tion. Consequently, it is argued that the Williams Act preempts state 
12. To the extent that state antitakeover Jaws aim to regulate the effects of corporate activity 
on a broad range of nonshareholder constituencies, these laws represent a return to an earlier 
vision of the appropriate uses of corporation law, a vision that rejects corporation Jaw's narrow 
preoccupation with the internal relation between management and shareholders in favor of a 
broader regulatory perspective acknowledging the social impact of corporation Jaw. See Millon, 
State Takeover Laws: A Rebirth of Corporation Law?, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 903 (1988). 
13. The antitakeover - and therefore antishareholder - thrust of state legislation may con-
flict with common law developments imposing a duty on target company management to maxi-
mize shareholder wealth in certain takeover situations. See Johnson, The Eventual Clash 
Between Judicial and Legislative Notions of Target Management Conduct, 14 J. CORP. L. 35 
(1988). 
14. See infra Part IV. 
15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1988). 
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"corporate" legislation aimed at achieving nonshareholder protection 
objectives that are threatened by unfettered capital markets. The re-
sult is not simply that state corporation law is displaced by federal 
securities law; the Williams Act's modest provisions are transformed 
into a broad federal pro-takeover policy. 
Underlying the SEC's preemption claim is its conviction about the 
pernicious effects of antitakeover legislation. The SEC, together with 
many other critics of antitakeover laws, I6 objects to the harmful im-
pact of those statutes on shareholder well-being, its sole concern. To 
the extent that these laws reduce the aggregate level of hostile takeover 
activity, the probability of a shareholder receiving a stock price pre-
mium of the magnitude that invariably accompanies a tender offer is 
greatly diminished.I7 Shareholders as a group also lose the heightened 
attention to profit maximization that a credible hostile takeover threat 
imposes on corporate management. Is Furthermore, society as a whole 
is denied the supposed benefits of takeovers as a force for reallocating 
economic resources to higher-valued uses. I9 As a result, according to 
16. See, e.g., Steinberg, Tender Offer Regulation: The Need for Reform, 23 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 1 (1988); Pozen, The New Round of State Tender Offer Statutes, 53 BROOKLYN L. REV. 89 
(1987); Block, Barton & Roth, State Takeover Statutes: The "Second Generation," 13 SEC. REG. 
L.J. 332 (1986); Levmore, Interstate Exploitation and Judicial Intervention, 69 VA. L. REV. 563, 
619-26 (1983); Comment, State Antitakeover Legislation: Unconstitutional Economic Folly, 20 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 475 (1988). 
17. There is considerable evidence that shareholders of target companies profit from corpo-
rate takeovers. See supra note 1 I; see also Jensen, Takeovers: Folklore and Science, 62 HARV. 
Bus. REV. 109 (Nov.-Dec. 1984); Jarrell, The Wealth Effects of Litigation by Targets: Do Inter-
ests Diverge in a Merge?, 28 J. L. & EcoN. 151 (1985). Not only do takeover statutes threaten 
shareholder opportunities to realize such profits, the passage of takeover laws may itself diminish 
the value of stock in corporations subject to such laws. If capital market participants believe that 
state takeover laws will succeed in reducing the probability of shareholders receiving takeover 
premiums, then, if capital markets are efficient, share prices should decline. There is some evi-
dence of such effects, as seen for example, in a recent study by the SEC's Office of the Chief 
Economist. The study found that the passage of Ohio's 1986 takeover law was followed by a 
drop in share prices of Ohio corporations in an amount roughly equal to two percent in value. 
The study concluded that the law appears to "redistribute wealth from shareholders of Ohio 
firms to the incumbent managements and workers of these firms, residents of Ohio." OFFICE OF 
THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, SEC. & EXCH. COMMN., SHAREHOLDER WEALTH EFFECTS OF OHIO 
LEGISLATION AFFECTING TAKEOVERS 3, 23 (May 18, 1987). The net result, if this study is 
correct and typical, is that shareholders lose immediate wealth as well as the possibility of even 
greater wealth from future takeover attempts. But see Romano, supra note 8, at 111, 180-87 (no 
statistically meaningful effect or result of Connecticut, Missouri, or Pennsylvania statutes). 
18. See Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in 
Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 841 (1981) ("[T]he market for corporate control may be 
the only potentially serious force for limiting management discretion."); Weiss, Economic Analy-
sis, Corporate Law, and the ALI Corporate Governance Project, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 27 (1984) 
("[T]he market for corporate control in general, and tender offers in particular, are the most 
important disciplinary factors in the corporate governance system, and should be encouraged."). 
19. Professor Demsetz has asserted that "takeovers and tender offers serve the interests of 
both shareholders and the nation." ECONOMIC FORUM ON TENDER OFFERS: PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 16 (Feb. 20, 1985) (statement by Professor Dem-
setz) (transcript on file with the Michigan Law Review). The Annual Report of the Council of 
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these critics, states are promoting parochial interests at the expense of 
shareholder property rights and the general society-wide interest in 
freely functioning capital markets and efficient resource allocation. 
This undesirable policy objective of state legislatures purportedly 
clashes with the investor protection aim of the Williams Act, and thus 
state legislation is said to be preempted.20 To the extent this reading 
of federal law has the further effect of imposing substantive restric-
tions on matters previously deemed to be within the province of state 
corporation law, it essentially federalizes portions of state corporation 
law and presumably will require the piecemeal development of a fed-
eral constitutional law of corporate takeovers.21 
· This Article examines the emerging controversy over preemption 
of the most potent of recent antitakeover laws, the so-called business 
combination statutes recently passed by Delaware, New York, and 
other states, and Pennsylvania's director-approval statute. 22 After ex-
amining the strategy employed by the states to shield these statutes 
from constitutional attack, we consider the issues raised by the pre-
emption claim and the arguments currently being advanced by the 
SEC and others in favor of preemption. Resolving the preemption 
controversy requires inquiry into the original meaning and objectives 
of the Williams Act. We argue that this should involve attention not 
only to the statute's linguistic context but also to certain critical as-
sumptions about takeovers and corporation law that formed the back-
Economic Advisors for 1985 reached a similar conclusion, finding that takeovers both increased 
national wealth and enhanced shareholder well-being: 
The available evidence, however, is that mergers and acquisitions increase national wealth. 
They improve efficiency, transfer scarce resources to higher valued uses, and stimulate eff-
fective corporate management. . . . The evidence is overwhelming that successful takeovers 
substantially increase the wealth of stockholders in target companies. 
ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 196-97 (Feb. 1985). 
20. The preemption arguments presently being advanced with respect to state legislation also 
apply to state common law governing takeovers. See Johnson & Millon, Does the Williams Act 
Preempt State Common Law in Hostile Takeovers?, 16 SEC. REG. L.J. 339 (1989). 
21. A tentative, fact-sensitive analysis of the impact of Delaware's new takeover statute on 
two takeover bids was displayed in recent decisions considering the constitutionality of that stat-
ute, see infra text accompanying notes 89-96. The decisions indicate that a whole body of law 
passing on the constitutional status of that and other statutes will need to be developed under the 
various economic and business scenarios of particular takeover bids. If, as the SEC argues, 
"shareholder welfare" is the touchstone against which these statutes are to be evaluated, see infra 
Part IV, then their constitutionality cannot be determined simply in the abstract, but only ac-
cording to how they operate in particular factual circumstances, which, in the takeover industry, 
will continue to evolve rapidly. · 
22. As part of a major overhaul of its corporation statute, Pennsylvania has adopted, effective 
October l, 1989, a provision empowering a corporation, acting through its board of directors, 
"[t)o accept, reject, respond to or take no action in respect of an actual or proposed acquisition, 
divestiture, tender offer, takeover or other fundamental change .... " 15 PA. CONS. STAT. 
1502(A)(l8). Since the basic thrust of Pennsylvania's law is the same as that of the business 
combination statutes, it will not be addressed separately. 
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drop against which Congress acted in 1968. We conclude that a 
proper understanding of the Williams Act offers no credible support 
for the preemption claim. Not only does a conventional analysis of 
statutory language and legislative history reveal that Congress did not 
seek to enact a general federal policy in favor of a robust market for 
corporate control, but appreciation of the historical context within 
which Congress acted demonstrates that such arguments are based on 
a mistaken equation of congressional assumptions with congressiortal 
intentions. In 1968 Congress made assumptions about certain core 
premises of state corporation law and about the macro-effects of take-
overs. These assumptions, however, did not amount to intentions 
about how we ought to regulate takeovers in a markedly different eco-
nomic and legal environment, an environment in which those assump-
tions no longer hold true. Congress did no more than address the 
takeover issue as it existed in 1968. It never addressed the important 
and distinctive policy questions that occupy us today. Accordingly, 
rather than claiming to find in the tea leaves of the Williams Act evi-
dence of an intent that does not exist, judges and policymakers should 
take a fresh look at the costs and benefits of hostile takeovers and the 
appropriate role of the states in their regulation. 
I. THE PREEMPTION CONTROVERSY AND ITS BACKGROUND 
A. The CTS Decision 
In CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 23 the United States 
Supreme Court rejected commerce and supremacy clause challenges to 
the Indiana "control share acquisition" takeover statute. 24 The statute 
provides that a tender offeror - one who has acquired a specified per-
centage of the stock of a target corporation chartered in and having 
other statutorily defined contacts with Indiana25 - will enjoy voting 
rights only if the remaining shareholders vote by a majority of shares 
to grant such voting rights.26 If the offeror is unwilling to await the 
23. 481 U.S. 69 (1987). 
24. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-42-1 to -11 (West 1989). 
25. In addition to Indiana incorporation, the statute is limited to corporations having 100 or 
more shareholders, principal place of business or principal office, or substantial assets in Indiana, 
and either 10% of its shareholders resident in Indiana or 10% of its shares owned by Indiana 
residents, or 10,000 shareholders resident in Indiana. IND. CODE ANN.§ 23-1-42-4 (West 1989). 
26. Voting rights require approval by a majority of all shares and then by a majority of 
disinterested shares. "Interested" shares are defined as those shares held or controlled by the 
acquirer or by officers or inside directors of the target company. IND. CODE ANN.§§ 23-1-42-3, 
-9(b) (West 1989). Because only shares owned or controlled by the bidder or by target company 
insiders are deemed to be "interested" and the bidder generally will not have purchased tendered 
shares by the plebiscite's record date, the stock of tendering shareholders evidently can be voted 
favorably on the voting rights question. This feature significantly dilutes the power of nontender-
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next annual meeting for such a plebiscite, it may request that a special 
shareholders' meeting take place to decide the voting rights question 
within fifty days, at the offeror's expense. If the target company share-
holders vote to confer voting rights, all nonbidder shareholders then 
have the option to "dissent" and r~ceive "fair value" for their shares 
f!-"om the target corporation. 27 
Indiana's legislative strategy responded to the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Edgar v. MITE Corp., 28 which had struck down an Illinois 
arititakeover law on commerce clause grounds. The Illinois law ap-
plied to foreign as well as domestic corporations, imposed various pro-
cedural burdens on hostile takeovers, . and required a state 
administrative proceeding that, among other matters, subjected an of-
fer to a vaguely defined "fairness" review.29 Emphasizing its extrater-
ritorial impact and the insufficiency of the local interests it was 
designed to protect, the Court in MITE held that the statute unconsti-
tutionally burdened interstate commerce. 30 In addition, three justices 
found the statute to be preempted by the Williams Act.31 This plural-
ity interpreted the Williams Act as mandating that shareholders pos-
sess the power to decide whether a tender offer will succeed. 
Shareholders exercise this power through their individual decisions to 
tender or hold their stock in response to a hostile bid. The Illinois 
statute, however, effectively usurped that power from the shareholders 
by interjecting a state administrator into the takeover process. Even if 
that regulatory mechanism were truly designed to enhance target 
shareholder welfare in some substantive fashion, the plurality argued, 
it would be preempted by the Williams Act because, procedurally, it 
interfered with shareholder resolution of takeover contests.32 
MITE seemed to sound the death knell for state efforts to regulate 
hostile takeovers. 33 However, by locating takeover provisions within 
ing shareholders to block a tender offer whenever a majority of "disinterested" shares has re-
sponded favorably. 
27. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-11 (West 1989). 
28. 457 U.S. 624 (1982). 
29. See Illinois Business Take-Over Act, Pub. Act No. 80-1421, §§ 1-20, 1978 Ill. Laws 1581, 
1581-95, repealed by Act Effective Sept. 14, 1983, Pub. Act No. 83-365, [1983] 2 Ill. Laws 3094. 
30. 457 U.S. at 640-46. 
31. 457 U.S. at 630-40. 
32. 457 U.S. at 633-34. 
33. After MITE, virtually all challenged takeover statutes were held unconstitutional. See 
Jonnson; Minnesota's Control Share Acquisition Statute and the Need for New Judicial Analysis of 
State Takeover Legislation, 12 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 183, 191-92 n.29 (1986) (collecting pre-
1985 decisions); see also Dynamics Corp. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986), revd., 481 
U.S. 69 (1987); Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986), remanded 
sub nom. Ohio v. Fleet Aerospace Corp., 481U.S.1026 (1987); Terry v. Yamashita, 643 F. Supp. 
161 (D. Haw. 1986). 
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the general incorporation statutes and structuring them as laws defin-
ing shareholder voting rights rather than directly regulating the take-
over process as such, Indiana and other states adopting control share 
acquisition laws sought to characterize their efforts as legislation en-
tirely within the jurisdictional sphere traditionally reserved to the 
states.34 This basic strategy, as far as it went, was vindicated in CTS. 
The Supreme Court's commerce clause analysis was strongly influ-
enced by its view of the Indiana law as one entitled to the deference 
traditionally accorded state legislation addressing internal corporate 
governance matters. 3s 
Speaking to the preemption issue, 36 the Court in CTS emphasized 
the lack of a direct conflict between federal and state law.37 The Court 
interpreted the Williams Act as having two purposes: to protect 
shareholders in relation to offerors and to adopt a neutral posture vis-
a-vis bidders and target company management.38 The Court read the 
Indiana statute as a proshareholder enactment, and therefore consis-
tent with federal law, for two reasons. First, the Court simplistically 
equated shareholder decisionmaking power with proshareholder pol-
icy. 39 The Indiana statute gave shareholders, as a body, the apparent 
ability to determine whether a hostile offer will succeed through exer-
cise of their power to decide the voting rights question. The Court 
thus implicitly denied the importance of the distinction between indi-
34. See Cox, The Constitutional "Dynamics" of the Internal Affairs Rule - A Comment on 
CTS Corporation, 13 J. CciRP. L. 317 (1988). 
35. The Court acknowledged the statute's interstate impact, conceding that it applied to 
shareholders of Indiana corporations who resided outside Indiana's borders. Noting that many 
features of state corporation law have a similar impact, the Court concluded that, absent discrim· 
ination or inconsistent regulation, such effects could not be a basis for commerce clause invalida· 
tion. Furthermore, the Court viewed the statute as designed primarily to protect shareholders of 
Indiana corporations against coercive two-tier offers, deemed by the Court to be a legitimate state 
interest. See 481 U.S. at 91-93. 
36. The supremacy clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, is the source of the preemption 
doctrine. The Supreme Court has enunciated four different grounds for preemption. First, Con· 
gress may expressly preempt state law in a particular area. See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator 
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947). Second, a court may find that Congress intended "to occupy a 
field" by means of a pervasive regulatory scheme. See, e.g., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air 
Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633-34 (1973). Third, where "compliance with both federal and 
state regulations is a physical impossibility," preemption may be found. See, e.g., Florida Lime 
& Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963). Finally, a law that "stands as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress" is 
preempted. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69, 79 (1987) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 
312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)) .. Only the fourth of these tests applies to the question of the constitution-
ality of state antitakeover laws under the Williams Act. See CTs. 481 U.S. at 79. For a critique 
of the preemption doctrine as developed by the Supreme Court, see Wolfson, Preemption and 
Federalism: The Missing Link, 16 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 69 (1988). 
37. See 481 U.S. at 78-87. 
38. 481 U.S. at 81-84. 
39. 481 U.S. at 84. 
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vidual shareholder decisionmaking, expressed through decisions to 
tender or hold stock, and collective choice exercised by means of decid-
ing to grant or withhold voting rights. Second, quite apart from the 
ostensible shareholder democracy design of Indiana's law, the Court 
stressed that the effect of the statute is to protect shareho1ders from 
the coercion of two-tier tender offers.40 This ex post view of Indiana's 
law, which focuses on how target company shareholders are protected 
by the statute once a takeover bid is launched, ignores the ex ante 
concern that such legislation might dampen the aggregate level of 
takeover activity, to the detriment of shareholders as a class.41 Thus, 
while the Court in CTS declined to decide whether the MITE plural-
ity's reading of the Williams Act is correct,42 it concluded that the 
Indiana statute meets that standard of investor protection in any 
event, because it is a proshareholder enactment.43 The Court shed lit-
tle light, however, on the meaning of "investor protection" under the 
Williams Act because it failed to define whether the word "investor" 
in that phrase means shareholders as a nationwide class, actual target 
company shareholders, or merely some subset of target shareholders, 
namely those facing coercive bids. Moreover, the Court failed to clar-
ify whether the word "protection" always, never, or sometimes means 
substantive, paternalistic protection of shareholders rather than pres-
ervation of shareholder decisionmaking autonomy. This guarded reso-
lution of the preemption issue leaves undecided the pivotal question of 
whether the Williams Act requires that individual target company 
shareholders possess the power to qetermine a hostile bid's success or 
failure where the decisionmaker is not a state agency as in MITE, or 
other shareholders as in CTS, but target management itself. 
CTS also leaves undecided the more fundamental question of 
whether the Williams Act mandates an unflinching shareholder wel-
fare policy that overrides state legislative efforts to protect nonshare-
holders at shareholders' expense. The failure to address this issue is 
odd because Justice Powell, author of the Court's opinion in CTS, 
concurred in MITE on the ground that states possess a legitimate in-
40. 481 U.S. at 84. Such bids can result in coercion of shareholders to tender because the 
offerer announces that it will pay a high premium only to a certain percentage of shareholders 
who tender promptly, the remainder to be cashed out later at a lower price by means of a merger. 
For discussion of how control share acquisition statutes ameliorate the coercion problem, see 
Booth, The Promise of State Takeover Statutes, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1635 (1988). For a response to 
Professor Booth, see Johnson & Millon, Missing the Point About State Takeover Statutes, 87 
MICH. L. REV. 846 (1989). In fact, two-tier offers are extremely rare nowadays. Id. at 847 & 
nn.6-7; see infra note 73. 
41. See supra notes 17-18; see also Cox, supra note 34, at 333-36. 
42. 481 U.S. at 80-81. 
43. 481 U.S. at 84. 
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terest in c~nsidering nonshareholder constituencies.44 Additionally, 
Indiana corporation law expressly authorizes directors to consider an 
array of such factors in determining how to respond to a takeover 
bid. 45 This bedrock question was not addressed because the Court fas-
tidiously avoided any serious analysis of the purpose or effect of the 
Indiana statute. 46 It would have been impossible to see. the Indiana 
statute as a proshareholder enactment if the Court had been persuaded 
that its design and operation reflected a purpose to protect local non-
shareholders by reducing ex ante the volume of hostile takeovers. In-
diana conceded in its brief that at least one of the statute's purposes 
was to address concerns about corporate liquidations and removals 
from the state.47 It responded to those concerns by giving target com-
pany shareholders, who it unrealistically stated might themselves be 
community residents, employees, or suppliers of the corporation,48 the 
power to block takeovers that might have those effects. 49 By simplisti-
cally equating ostensible shareholder decisionmaking power with 
proshareholder purpose, however, the Court did not expressly con-
sider whether the statute's real beneficiaries were intended t.o be non-
shareholders. Thus, it did not resolve the constitutional propriety of 
deploying state corporation law in a manner harmful to investors, the 
intended beneficiaries of the Williams Act. As for the statute's likely 
effect, Judge Posner's opinion for the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit, which struck down the Indiana statute on preemption and 
commerce clause grounds, had concluded that the burdens imposed by 
the statute on offerors would have a severe chilling effect on tender 
offers.50 In short, Judge Posner looked through the statute's cosmetic 
proshareholder design to its actual effects on aggregate takeover activ-
ity and hence on the welfare of shareholders generally. To this the 
Supreme Court, in its commerce clause analysis, tersely responded 
that it saw "little evidence" that the statute would decrease the 
number of successful tender offers,51 and that its analysis would not 
change even if the statute demonstrably had that effect. 52 
44. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 646 (1982). 
45. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-35-1 (West 1989). 
46. See 481 U.S. at 82 n.7 and 94. 
47. See 481 U.S. at 99-106 (White, J., dissenting). 
48. See 481 U.S. at 99-106 (White, J., dissenting). 
49. See 481 U.S. at 99-106 (White, J., dissenting). 
50. See Dynamics Corp. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 262-63, 264 (7th Cir. 1986), revd., 481 
U.S. 69 (1987). 
51. 481 U.S. at 93. Apparently, the record before the Court contained no such evidence. See 
Langevoort, The Supreme Court and the Politics of Corporate Takeovers, 101 HARV. L. REV. 96, 
103 n.45 (1987). 
52. 481 U.S. at 93. 
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The Court in CTS disregarded the significant likelihood that share-
holders in companies subject to the Indiana statute might, as the ironic 
price for receiving an apparently central role in takeover decisionmak-
ing, lose opportunities to receive tender offers. Therefore, it saw no 
need to decide whether a takeover statute causing such a substantial 
chilling effect would offend the policy of the Williams Act. Neverthe-
less, by emphasizing that Indiana's law would not "alter the balance 
between management and offeror in any significant way,"53 the Court 
seemed to interpret the much-heralded "investor protection" policy of 
the Williams Act as requiring a kind of substantive evaluation of how 
shareholders fare under Indiana's law.54 However, the Court ignored 
this requirement in the commerce clause portion of the opinion when 
it indicated that the statute's deterrence of bids would not alter that 
analysis. 55 By refraining from a corresponding disclaimer in the pre-
emption analysis, the Court seems to imply that the effect of a statute 
on shareholder welfare does make a difference and that, constitution-
ally, a statute significantly precluding the occurrence of takeover bids 
would run afoul of the Williams Act. Measuring the macroeconomic 
effects of antitakeover statutes in this fashion is extraordinarily diffi-
cult. It also reads the Williams Act as an overarching federal policy 
on takeovers designed to ensure that states cannot, in the name of 
"corporatizing"56 the law governing takeover contests, substantially 
curtail the frequency of hostile bids to the detriment of shareholders. 
Thus, while the Court in CTS may have concluded that, viewed ex 
post, Indiana's statute provides some measure of formal shareholder 
protection, it also seems to assume that the Williams Act would pre-
vent the states from limiting too severely the aggregate level of take-
over activity in order to protect nonshareholders. The tension in these 
two positions is obvious, but was deftly dodged in CTS. 
B. ''Business Combination" Anti takeover Statutes and the 
"Corporatization" of Tender Offer Regulation 
The design of the control share acquisition statute at issue in CTS, 
53. 481 U.S. at 82 n.7. 
54. Justice Powell's opinion also includes a strong flavor of shareholder autonomy, a point 
seen in his analysis that an assessment of a takeover statute's impact on shareholder status vis-a-
vis management was necessary for preemption analysis. He stated that the Indiana statute "pro-
tects the independent shareholder against [both) of the contending parties .... Unlike the MITE 
statute, the Indiana Act does not give either management or the offeror an advantage in commu-
nicating with the shareholders about an impending offer. . . . The Act allows shareholders to 
ev~luate the fairness of the offer collectively." 481 U.S. at 82-84 (emphasis added). 
55. 481 U.S. at 93-94. 
56. See infra text accompanying notes 80-82. 
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along with the Court's almost shut-eyed analysis of its true purposes 
and likely effects, allowed the Court to avoid confronting hard ques-
tions of policy and constitutionality. A more potent form of antitake-
over statute, recently adopted by several states, presents those 
questions in a manner that demands resolution. So-called "business 
combination" statutes take an altogether different approach to the 
problem of takeover regulation. At least sixteen states, including Del-
aware and New York, have adopted versions of this type of statute.57 
These statutes, subject to certain exceptions, prevent hostile tender of-
ferors from completing defined "business combinations" - such as 
mergers, consolidations, substantial sales of assets, and liquidations -
for periods of three to five years after acquisition of control through a 
successful tender offer. The effect is to prevent a hostile bidder from 
using its power of control to engage in the post-takeover "bust-up" 
transactions that typically motivate takeovers. The chief uniform ex-
ception to the moratorium is advance approval of the stock acquisition 
itself or the proposed business combination by the pre-offer target 
company board of directors. 58 The effect of this exception is to require 
bidders to approach target company boards to discuss proposed acqui-
sitions. Other statutes also allow the board to approve otherwise pro-
scribed transactions after completion of the tender offer.59 At least 
one state, Delaware, includes another exception for acquisitions of 
more than eighty-five percent of outstanding stock in a single transac-
tion; in such cases, the business combination moratorium does not 
apply.60 
In contrast to the control share acquisition statutes, the business 
combination laws do not condition either the purchase or voting of 
stock on shareholder approval. Rather, they limit the manner in 
which a successful bidder may exercise control over the acquired com-
57. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-1221 to -1223 (1987); 1988 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 88-
350 (signed into law June 7, 1988); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1988); GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 14-2-237(a) (1988) (to be recodified at§ 14-2-1132 on July 1, 1989); IND. CODE ANN.§ 23·1· 
43 (West 1989); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 271A.396 to .399 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988); 
MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 302A.673 (West Supp. 1989); Mo. ANN. STAT.§§ 351.450 to .459 (Vernon 
1986 & Supp. 1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:10A (West Supp. 1988); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW 
§ 912 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1989); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. 2551-2556 (1988); TENN. CODE 
ANN. §§48-35-201 to 209 (1988); VA. CORP. CODE§§ 13.1-725 to 730 (Supp. 1988); WASH. 
REV. CODE ANN.§ 23A.08.425 (Supp. 1988); WIS. STAT. ANN.§ 180.726 (West Supp. 1988). 
58. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a)(l) (Supp. 1988); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW 
§ 912(b) (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1989). 
59. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-122l(D) (1987); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 271A.398(3)(a) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988). 
60. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a)(2) (Supp. 1988). Other states adopting business combi-
nation statutes have established higher or lower percentages than Delaware's statute. See, e.g., 
GA. CODE ANN. 14-2-237(a) (Supp. 1988) (to be recodified at § 14-2-1132 on July 1, 1989) 
(90%); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. 2551-56 (1988) (80%). 
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pany. In prohibiting certain transactions by the corporate enterprise, 
business combination laws less directly interfere with capital market 
activities and more clearly reflect the strategy of corporatizing a por-
tion of the tender offer process. Since many contemporary hostile bids 
are followed by partial dismantling of the corporate enterprise to gen-
erate funds for repayment of acquisition indebtedness or to realize a 
profit for the acquirer,61 one possible effect of the statutes is to discour-
age those "bust-up" bids that are not approved by the target company 
board. Almost by definition, board approval of a hostile bid is ex-
tremely unlikely because the bid itself is often perceived as an indict-
ment of the target company board's past performance and is likely to 
result in the loss of jobs by directors and senior management. These 
statutes therefore present a formidable obstacle to the typical hostile 
overture, particularly when coupled with laws permitting target com-
pany directors to consider nonshareholder constituencies in formulat-
ing a takeover response. 62 
The key feature of these statutes is that they expressly inject target 
company management into the decisionmaking process, giving it an 
effective veto power over hostile bids to be followed by "business com-
binations" - a veto that the bidder and target company shareholders 
are virtually powerless to override. Delaware's exception for tender 
offers in which the bidder acquires eighty-five percent of target com-
pany stock may seem to preserve for shareholders a limited power uni-
laterally to decide a bid's fate. However, that exception may be of 
little practical utility because it is unclear whether any significant 
number of tender offers will attract so favorable a response. 63 Indeed, 
in early challenges to the statute ·the SEC has offered evidence that this 
will not be the case, 64 a position bolstered by the growing practice of 
placing large blocks of stock in friendly hands such as ESOPs, 65 a tac-
tic recently upheld by the Delaware Court of Chancery.66 If so, the 
61. See Coffee, supra note 6, at 2-4. 
62. See infra note 69. 
63. According to one commentator, "commonly, a substantial fraction of an acquired tar-
get's shareholders - frequently as much as twenty or thirty percent - fail to tender their 
shares." Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 98 
HARV. L. REV. 1695, 1714 (1985) (citing Study of the Office of the Chief Economist, Sec. & 
Exch. Commn., The Economics of Any-or-All, Partial, and Two-Tier Tender Offers, Table 9 
(Apr. 19, 1985)). Bebchuk notes that those who do not tender typically fall into one of three 
categories: those who were unable to tender because they were unaware of the bid or could not 
tender in time; those who believed that their stock was worth more than the amount offered; and 
those who chose not to tender for tax reasons. Id. at 1714 n.57. 
64. See infra note 96 and accompanying text. 
65. See Hilder & Smith, ESOP Defenses Are Likely to Increase, Wall St. J., Apr. 6, · 1989, at 
A2, col. 1. 
66. In Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. 
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only meaningful exception to Delaware's prohibition of business com-
binations will be the procuring of target company management's 
approval. 67 
The business combination statutes differ from the control share ac-
quisition statutes in another important respect. Their design belies 
any claim that they are enacted for the primary benefit of sharehold-
ers, whether shareholders generally or those actually confronting an 
offer to purchase. 68 First, by vesting dispositive decisionmaking power 
in the board rather than with shareholders (either individually or col-
lectively) and conferring apparently broad discretion on the board in 
its exercise of this power, 69 the statutes contemplate that takeover ef-
forts may fail even though they might have commanded wide share-
holder approval. CTS' s equation of collective shareholder choice and 
proshareholder purpose cannot be applied here. Nor can its descrip-
tion of Indiana's statute as not altering "the balance between manage-
Rep. (CCH) 1194,176 (Del. Ch. 1989), the Delaware Chancery Court upheld Polaroid's action of 
issuing approximately 14% of its outstanding stock to a newly established Employee Stock Own-
ership Plan. When coupled with Polaroid's share repurchase plan and placement of preferred 
stock into friendly hands, the ESOP measure made it virtually impossible for Shamrock to ac-
quire 85% of Polaroid's stock as needed to escape operation of Delaware's antitakeover statute. 
See supra note 60 and accompanying text. As a result, Shamrock dropped its bid. 
67. Most of the business combination statutes include provisions that allow shareholders to 
"opt out" of the statutory moratorium. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203{b){l) (Supp. 
1988); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912{d)(3)(iii) (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1989). These opt-out 
provisions typically require articles or bylaws amendments or other procedures dependent on a 
shareholder vote. See infra note 71 and accompanying text. Presumably management will op-
pose efforts to escape the statute's coverage. Because management controls the proxy machinery, 
it is likely to be able to influence decisively the outcome of the shareholder vote in this as in other 
areas. See generally M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION chs. 9-10 (1976) 
(discussing management's power through its control of proxy machinery). Indeed, it is precisely 
because of the difficulties that stand in the way of challenging management in proxy contests that 
the tender offer has enjoyed such popularity. Thus, the opt-out provision brings to management 
in the takeover setting the inherent benefit of the proxy system. 
68. One should not be misled by efforts to package these antitakeover laws in proshareholder 
terms. The Delaware statute's official legislative synopsis suggests that shareholder welfare is the 
statute's primary criterion, referring to an intention "to strike a balance between the benefits of 
an unfettered market for corporate shares and the well documented and judicially recognized 
need to limit abusive takeover tactics." Other states are more explicit, such as North Carolina's 
description of its business combination statute as "The North Carolina Shareholder Protection 
Act." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-15 (Supp. 1988); see infra note 78. 
69. Some states explicitly authorize target company boards to take into account the impact of 
a takeover on nonshareholders. Minnesota, for example, states that "a director may, in consider-
ing the best interests of the corporation, consider the interests of the corporation's employees, 
customers, suppliers, and creditors, the economy of the state and nation, community and societal 
considerations, and the long-term as well as short-term interests of the corporation and its share-
holders including the possibility that these interests may be best served by the continued indepen-
dence of the corporation." MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 302A.251, subd. 5 (West Supp. 1989). Several 
other states have adopted similar provisions. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-l(d) (West 
1989); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 8.85 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 1701.59(E)(4) (Anderson Supp. 1988); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8363{b) (Purdon Supp. 
1988). Arizona's provision is unique in being mandatory rather than merely permissive. See 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-1202 (1987). 
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ment and offeror in any significant way."70 Directors, not the body of 
shareholders or the bidder, are given the central role in the takeover 
drama.71 
Second, the rationale for empowering the board for the purpose of 
paternalistically protecting shareholders, rather than allowing them to 
decide for themselves whether to tender, does not justify either the 
broad powers conferred on the board or the kinds of corporate trans-
actions proscribed. One might argue that unimpaired shareholder 
d~cisionmaking cannot function properly in cases of two-tier tender 
offers.72 In fact, two-tier offers are exceedingly rare today.73 More 
important, the coverage 9f business combination statutes is not con-
fined to those situations in which coercion seems likely. Thus, board 
approval of cash bids for all of a company's stock is also required. 
Better tailored to the largely extinct problem of sJ;iareholder coercion 
are the so-called "fair price" and "dissenters' rights" statutes,74 which 
attempt to ensure that nontendering shareholders will nevertheless re-
ceive fair value for their shares, and control share acquisition statutes 
allowing shareholders themselves to defuse the coercion. In any event, 
the "bust-up" acquisitions at which the statute is truly aimed are gen-
erally all-cash, all-shares bids that of necessity are financed by huge 
borrowings sufficient to pay all shareholders immediately and in full. 
Here, the standard "coercion" argument is inappropriate. So too is 
the related concern that the resulting entity will be saddled with exces-
sive debt - existing shareholders are gone and have no lingering con-
70. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69, 82 n.7 (1987). 
71. This has led many institutional investors to sponsor shareholder proposals opting out of 
Delaware's takeover statute. As stated by Steven Cohen, deputy counsel for the New York City 
comptroller's office, which oversees the New York City Employees Retirement System: "lnstitu· 
tional investors feel shareholders should have the right to decide whether to accept a tender offer 
in a hostile takeover. Delaware's law infringes on my right to do that." Geylein & Koenig, 
Pension Funds Plot Against Takeover Law, Wall St. J., Apr. 5, 1989, at Cl, col. 5 (quoting 
Cohen). 
72. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
73. From 1982 to 1986, the number of two·tier offers declined from 18% to only 3%; only 
six such offers occurred in 1987. See Mendelsohn & Berg, Anti· Takeover Bill Would Shift Bal-
ance of Power, Natl. L.J., Feb. 8, 1988, at 40, 41 n.21 (citing SEC empirical study and statement 
of SEC Commissioner Cox before the Senate Committee on Banking, Hoilsing, and Urban Af-
fairs). In the words of Commissioner Cox, "the market appears to have corrected any problem 
that may have existed." Id. at 40. 
74. "Fair price" statutes require the successful bidder to pay a "fair price" to nontendering 
target company shareholders or obtain supermajority shareholder approval of any merger or 
consolidation of the target and the acquirer. Examples include CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§§ 33-
374a to -374c (West 1987); Mo. CORPS. & AsSNS. CODE ANN. §§ 3-601 to -603 (1986); VA. 
CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-725 to- -728 (1985). "Dissenters' rights" statutes confer on nontendering 
target company shareholders the right to be cashed out at either fair value or an agreed-upon 
price. See, e.g., M,E. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 910 (Supp. 1985);- PA. STAT. ANN. tit. -15, 
§ 1910 (Purdon Supp. 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-76.5 (1986). 
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cem for the condition of the forsaken enterprise. Thus, the business 
combination statutes are drawn much too broadly to justify manage-
ment's assigned role of "protecting" shareholder interests. 
Third, even if the statutes enable directors to protect shareholders 
facing a particular bid by serving as bargaining agents whose function 
is to resist in order to extract higher bids, to the extent the statutes 
also have the effect of generally reducing the frequency of hostile 
tender offers ex ante, shareholders as a class lose both the opportunity 
to realize immediate stock price premiums and the accountability 
mechanisms that the threat of hostile takeovers are said to provide 
over the longer term. Moreover, until the Delaware courts do what 
they continually have stopped short of doing - insisting that in all 
instances in which a hostile bid is launched the target company 
board's sole function is to auction the company to the highest bidder 
- there is no legal obligation to negotiate at all, much less to do so in 
a manner that procures the greatest possible premium. Thus, while 
business combination laws position target directors to bargain vigor-
ously, they do not compel them to do so. Meanwhile, the empower-
ment of the board may nevertheless have an ex ante deterrent effect on 
hostile bids for company's subject to such statutes. 
·Finally, the explicit focus of the business combination statutes on 
"bust-up" rather than coercive takeovers is aimed less at serving 
shareholders than at protecting nonshareholder interests that will be 
damaged by asset relocations. 75 Since the statutes do not deprive a 
successful tender offeror of control as such, a bidder willing to post-
pone any of the disruptive transactions covered by the statute might 
not be deterred by its restrictions. The design of the statutes indicates 
a desire to restrict "bust-up" takeovers but not those motivated by 
other objectives. Nonshareholder interests might be damaged by cor-
porate "break-ups," but not by bids preserving the business intact; 
shareholders, however, presumably will benefit from both forms of 
takeovers. Consequently, the prohibition on post-takeover corporate 
activity, rather than on the form or conduct of the takeover activity 
itself, reveals a policy aimed at sacrificing shareholder interests to 
those of certain enterprise-dependent nonshareholders. 
The legislative history of New York's business combination stat-
ute, which has provided the model for subsequent enactments in other 
states, clearly indicates that its purpose is to protect nonshareholders 
from the impact of hostile takeovers. The official Memorandum on 
the original bill discusses New York's desire to avoid the adverse ef-
75. See infra note 103. 
June 1989] Misreading the Williams Act 1879 
fects of takeovers on target company employees and local communi-
ties, and anticipates that the new law will result in tender offerors 
having increased commitment to the long-term welfare of New York 
corporations and their employees. 76 The implication is that the mora-
torium on post-tender offer transactions will prevent successful ac-
quirers from taking, and prospective bidders from seriously 
considering, actions that threaten the continuity of target company op-
erations. More broadly, the law seeks to preserve e~isting relation-
ships between New York corporations and those dependent on them, 
and thus refers to promotion of "long-term growth of New York resi-
dent domestic corporations."77 Other states that have since adopted 
business combination statutes have also forthrightly expressed their 
concern for the effects of takeover activity on nonshareholders. 78 This 
76. See Governor's Program Bill, 1985 Extraordinary Session, Memorandum (ch. 915) at 6, 
9. In support of the bill, the AFL-CIO stated that "[n]o matter which side wins control in a 
takeover battle, workers, customer5, and the community in which the company is located are the 
likely ultimate losers." AFL-CIO Support Memorandum 1 (Dec. 10, 1985) (quoting statement 
of May 8, 1985). The Business Council of New York State endorsed the legislation for similar 
reasons: "This bill meets our objective - an objective we share with organized labor - of 
encouraging long-term investment in New York and protecting the long-term interests of New 
York companies, shareholders, employees and communities .... " Press Release, The Business 
Council of New York State (Dec. 10, 1985) (quoting Raymond T. Schuler, president). The au-
thors are grateful to Ted Madara for sharing his research on the New York law's legislative 
history. 
77. Governor's Program Bill, 1985 Extraordinary Session, Memorandum (ch. 915) at 1. 
78. For example, a recent statute amending North Carolina's "Shareholder Protection Act" 
includes this preamble: 
Whereas, takeovers and takeover attempts of corporations in North Carolina have been 
occurring with increasing frequency; and 
Whereas, such activity can be highly disruptive to communities within North Carolina 
by causing, among other things, high unemployment and erosion of the State and local 
economy and tax base; and 
Whereas, many of these corporations are not presently subject to the North Carolina 
Shareholder Protection Act since while substantially present in North Carolina they are 
chartered elsewhere; and 
Whereas, these corporations offer employment to a large number of North Carolina citi-
zens who pay income taxes, property and other taxes in this State; and 
Whereas, these corporations pay significant amounts of income taxes to North Carolina; 
and 
Whereas, these corporations pay substantial State and local property taxes; and 
Whereas, these corporations pay substantial sales and use taxes in North Carolina; and 
Whereas, these corporations provide their North Carolina employees with health, retire-
ment and other benefits; and 
Whereas, these corporations and their employees contribute greatly to community 
projects in North Carolina; and 
Whereas, many unrelated businesses rely on these corporations to purchase goods and 
services; and 
Whereas, North Carolina has a vital interest in providing to these corporations the bene-
fits of the provisions of the North Carolina Shareholder Protection Act; .... 
Act of May 1, 1987, ch. 124, 1987 N.C. Sess. Laws preamble. Wisconsin's statute declares that 
Wisconsin corporations "encompass, represent and affect, through their ongoing business opera-
tions, a variety of constituencies including shareholders, employe[e]s, customers, suppliers and 
local communities and their economies," and states further that it is intended "to promote the 
welfare of these constituencies" and to "allow for stable, long-term growth of resident domestic 
corporations." Act of Sept. 17, 1987, 1987 Wis. Laws 45, §§ 1(2), (3). Connecticut has recently 
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refreshing candor has led the SEC to describe the New York and simi-
lar laws as an unconstitutional attempt to shield local economic inter-
ests from the workings of the national securities markets. 79 
Motivated less by solicitude for nonresident shareholders than by 
an understandable concern for a host of local nonshareholder inter-
ests, states adopting business combination statutes have sought to 
"corporatize" regulation of the tender offer process. It is possible to 
regard tender offers as straightforward securities transactions, that is, 
to characterize their central feature as involving nothing more than 
the decision by individual shareholders to sell or refuse to sell their 
stock to a prospective purchaser. Under this view, one could argue 
that tender offers, as transactions aimed directly at shareholders and 
effected through the national capital markets, are purely for share-
holders to resolve and fall entirely within the domain of federal securi-
ties regulation. Tender offers for stock, however, ultimately involve 
contests for control of corporate assets. Consequently, stock is sought 
not merely for routine investment purposes, but as the vehicle for 
achieving more ambitious objectives, objectives that implicate the en-
tire corporate enterprise. Thus, the practical significance of hostile 
takeovers may more closely resemble the impact on the corporation of 
a merger, major asset sale, dissolution, or other fundamental change in 
the corporate entity in which the voice of directors as well as share-
holders has long been heard. so States, therefore, point to post-acquisi-
passed a takeover law that empowers something called a Connecticut Partnership Compact -
including representatives of labor and citizen groups, as well as of business and the legislature -
to impose conditions on certain post-takeover transactions for the benefit of various non-
shareholder interests. 1988 Conn. Pub. Acts 88-350, § 6; see Connecticut Takeover Statute Bar-
ring Raiders Signed Into Law, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 925 (1988). 
79. The SEC has described the New York law as "economic protectionism," "designed to 
promote the interests of local economies and employees, at the expense of shareholders ••.. " 
SEC Says New York Takeover Law Violates Commerce, Supremecy Clauses, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. 
Rep. (BNA) 379 (1988). 
80. See, e.g., MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT §§ 11.03, 12.02, 14.02 (1988). The respective 
roles of directors and shareholders in responding to takeover bids is a bedrock governance issue 
that not only is addressed in contemporary corporate statutes, but also underlies the judiciary's 
seemingly unending efforts to delineate the common law fiduciary duties of target management. 
Recently, the crucial corporate governance dimension of this task has been re-acknowledged. 
For example, in City capital Assocs. v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988), the court 
stated: 
Our corporation law exists, not as an isolated body of rules and principles, but rather in 
a historical setting and as a part of a larger body of law premised upon shared values. To 
acknowledge that directors may employ the recent innovation of "poison pills" to deprive 
shareholders of the ability effectively to choose to accept a noncoercive offer, after the board 
has had a reasonable opportunity to explore or create alternatives, or attempt to negotiate 
on the shareholders' behalf, would, it seems to me, be so inconsistent with widely shared 
notions of appropriate corporate governance as to threaten to diminish the legitimacy and 
authority of our corporation law. 
551 A.2d at 799-800. In Grand Metropolitan, PLC v. Pillsbury Co., [1988-89 Transfer Binder] 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 94,104 (Del. Ch. 1988), the court stated: 
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tion aspects of tender offers as justifying their subjection to regulation 
through state corporation law, with its focus on "internal" governance 
matters. Viewing takeovers and their aftermath as a "corporate" mat-
ter serves to justify the direct involvement of the target company 
board, whose traditional fiduciary duty is to manage the firm's affairs 
in the interest of the corporate enterprise as a whole, 81 not purely in 
the interests of shareholders. Furthermore, like annual directors' elec-
tions, takeovers also implicate the "internal" governance question of 
the relationship between capital providers, on the one hand, and capi-
tal managers, on the other. Federal securities law may impose certain 
disclosure obligations on the process for electing directors through the 
proxy rules, 82 but the manner in which changes in voting control of 
corporations may be effected is largely structured by state law. 
Thus, motivated by the broad impact of "bust-up" takeovers on 
the entire web oflocal corporate relationships, and taking refuge in the 
supremacy of state law with respect to "corporate" and "internal" 
matters, states have shrewdly sought to transform tender offers from 
pure stock disposition matters for individual shareholders - arguably 
subject to federal rather than state regulation for that reason - into 
matters properly subject to state corporation law. This corporatiza-
tion strategy was especially ingenious because it paralleled perfectly 
the paradoxical philosophy of modern state corporation statutes: 
broadly empower management for the supposed purpose of benefiting 
shareholders. Ironically, protakeover corporation law scholars, many 
of whom are quick to defend enabling, promanagement corporation 
statutes as entirely consistent with shareholder well-being because of 
the extra-legal constraints imposed on broad managerial discretion by 
a well-functioning market for corporate control, found themselves 
hoisted by their own petards when states devised their corporatization 
To be sure, the Board of Directors are under a duty to exercise their best business judgment 
with respect to any proposal pertaining to corporate affairs, including tender offers. They 
may be right; they may know what is best for the corporation, but their judgment is not 
conclusive upon the shareholders. What is sometimes lost sight of in these tender offer 
controversies is that the shareholders, not the directors, have the right of franchise with 
respect to shares owned by them; "stockholders, once informed of the facts, have a right to 
make their own decisions in matters pertaining to their economic self-interest, whether con-
sonant with or contrary to the advice of others, whether such advice is tendered by manage-
ment or outsiders or those motivated by self-interest." 
[1988-89 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCR)~ 94,104 at p. 91,196 n.10 (quoting Conoco 
Inc. v. Seagram Co., 517 F. Supp. 1299, 1303 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)). 
81. Delaware courts have traditionally stated that directors owe fiduciary duties to "the cor-
poration and its shareholders." See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984); Guth v. 
Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. Ch. 1939), affd., 19 A.2d 721 (Del. 1941). 
82. The SEC Rules relating to proxy solicitation are contained in Regulation 14A, 17 C.F.R. 
§§ 240.14a-1 to .14a-14 (1988). Even if proxies are not solicited in connection with a shareholder 
meeting, the proxy rules require furnishing of information substantially equivalent to a proxy 
statement. See Regulation 14C, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14c-1 to .14c-101 (1988). 
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strategy. After all, the states had succeeded in crippling the workings 
of the capital market check on the laxity of state corporation law by 
subjecting capital market transactions themselves to state regulation. 
This legislative program of co-opting capital market phenomena, ini-
tially implemented in the control share acquisition statutes, finds its 
most mature and powerful expression in the business combination 
statutes. 
C. The Present Preemption Controversy 
1. Shareholder Autonomy Versus Shareholder Protection 
In light of state efforts to "corporatize" regulation of the takeover 
process, critics of state antitakeover laws in general, and of business 
combination statutes in particular, have made the most potent attack 
possible - constitutional infirmity. Invariably, the constitutional 
challenge is made on both commerce and supremacy clause grounds. 83 
The gist of the latter argument is that the Williams Act, adopted in 
1968, preempts the state statutes. The SEC has filed amicus curiae 
briefs in cases challenging the New York, Wisconsin, and Delaware 
statutes. 84 While a preemption argument can take different forms, 85 
the SEC argues that these statutes frustrate the Williams Act's pur-
pose. The SEC reads the Williams Act as preserving for target com-
pany shareholders the inviolable right to decide whether to accept 
tender offers, a right that we term "shareholder autonomy"; because 
business combination statutes impair that right, they are preempted. 
In a word, the process of shareholder resolution of takeover contests is 
central to the SEC's reading of the Williams Act. 
Faced with such constitutional challenges to their "corporatiza-
tion" strategy, targets and states have responded with their own read-
ing of the Williams Act. While agreeing that the Act was enacted to 
benefit shareholders, they reject the view that the process of share-
holder decisionmaking is a necessary or mandated ingredient in that 
policy. Instead, the focus is more substantive and evaluative: Is share-
holder well-being attained? If so, then the process by which that ob-
jective is achieved is irrelevant. Consequently, target management 
itself might be the mechanism best suited to protecting investors in 
certain instances. Management might, for example, adopt defensive 
83. Professors Butler and Ribstein have analyzed antitakeover statutes under the contract 
clause of the Constitution, concluding that both Indiana's and more potent statutes violate that 
clause. Butler & Ribstein, State Anti-Takeover Statutes and The Contract Clause, 41 U. C!N. L. 
REV. 611 (1988). 
84. See 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 379, 419, 735, 774 (1988). 
85. See supra note 36. 
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measures that enhance the bidding process for stock, or may go so far 
as to thwart a takeover bid - denying shareholders any opportunity 
to tender - where deemed necessary to "protect" shareholder inter-
ests. 86 The clearest cases for management intervention would there-
fore involve conduct aimed at blocking coercive two-tier offers or 
designed to attract an even higher premium than that being offered in 
an all-cash, all-shares bid. This reading interprets the Williams Act as 
allowing state law to accord a role for target company management 
intervention in the tender offer process where doing so would better 
protect shareholder interests than leaving them on their own. In 
short, this "shareholder protection" reading of the Act would justify 
restricting "shareholder autonomy" where necessary to achieve the 
higher goal of shareholder welfare. 
This basic difference in construing the Williams Act was not before 
the Supreme Court in CTS because the Indiana statute left the deci-
sionmaking power in the hands of target company shareholders, albeit 
their collective rather than individual hands. MITE had presented 
much the same clash between shareholder autonomy and shareholder 
protection, but with a crucial difference. A state agency, rather than 
shareholders or directors, had decisive power. Accordingly, it was the 
MITE decision that prompted states to adopt a "corporatization" 
rather than an overt regulatory strategy, housing antitakeover laws in 
the corporation statutes and conferring broad powers on management 
to look after the interests of the corporation and its shareholders. Fur-
thermore, since only two Justices had joined Justice White's share-
holder autonomy reading of the Williams Act in MITE, it seemed 
unlikely that a majority of the Court would object to a shareholder 
protection interpretation. 
After CTS, then, the preemption issue with respect to business 
combination statutes has been joined over these two readings of the 
Williams Act. Three recent decisions illustrate the significance of the 
distinction between the shareholder autonomy and shareholder protec-
tion constructions of the Williams Act in the context of these formida-
ble antitakeover statutes. In RTE Corp. v. Mark IV Industries, 87 a 
federal district court accepted the argument that the Williams Act 
preempts the Wisconsin version of that statute. Supported by an ami-
cus curiae brief from the SEC, the court adopted a shareholder au ton-
86. This raises under common law fiduciary duty principles the same shareholder protec-
tion/shareholder autonomy issue that arises under antitakeover statutes. See supra note 80. 
87. No. 88-C-378 (E.D. Wis. May 6, 1988) (unpublished memorandum decision and order), 
vacated as moot, [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1193,789 (E.D. Wis. June 
22, 1988). 
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omy construc~ion, holding that Congress sought to accomplish the 
goal of shareholder welfare by preserving shareholder choice as the 
means by which takeover contests should be resolved. The court em-
phasized the Wisconsin statute's ban on post-tender offer business 
combinations, excused only if target management assents, as an eff ec-
tive veto power over hostile bids. In finding the statute to be pre-
empted on that ground, the court stated that the Williams Act's 
"purpose ... is to ensure investor choice with respect to acceptance of 
tender offers .... [I]t should be the shareholders - the actual owners 
of the corporation - who make the decision whether or not to accept 
a tender offer."88 
In contrast, two recent decisions by the federal district court in 
Delaware reject this preemption analysis, focusing instead on a 
broader shareholder protection policy and finding the Delaware stat-
ute consistent with such a mandate. 89 In both decisions, the court 
acknowledged that Delaware's statute, like Wisconsin's, accords target 
company management a critical - and potentially decisive - role in 
determining whether a hostile takeover will succeed and therefore "re-
stricts shareholder choice in the hostile tender offer context. "9° In 
BNS, Inc. v. Koppers Co., the court justified management's assigned 
role as guardian of shareholder interests on the ground that it is con-
sistent with "the norm in current corporate law."91 The court is refer-
ring to state law's enabling philosophy and its reliance on traditional 
agency and fiduciary principles to circumscribe management discre-
tion and direct it toward achievement of shareholder welfare. In this 
framework, management, rather than the shareholders themselves, is 
generally charged with protection of shareholder financial interests. 
Under this interpretation, Delaware's antitakeover statute was simply 
another application of this basic idea. There is no preemption because 
the court saw shareholder protection - not autonomy - as the pur-
pose of the Williams Act. The result is that Delaware corporation law 
and federal securities law are brought into harmonious accord on the 
tender offer regulation issue. 
While the court in BNS was concerned that the Delaware statute 
88. RTE, No. 88-C-378, slip op. at 7-8; see also Alleghany Corp. v. Haase, 708 F. Supp. 1507 
(W.D. Wis. 1989) (citing the Younger abstention doctrine in refraining from ruling on constitu-
tionality of Wisconsin antitakeover statute); Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods 
Corp., 708 F. Supp. 984, 998 (E.D. Wis. 1989) (upholding Wisconsin antitakeover statute), ajfd., 
21 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 856 (1989). For a discussion of the district court's decision in 
Amanda, see infra text accompanying notes 219-27. 
89. BNS, Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458 (D. Del. 1988); RP Acquisition Corp. v. 
Staley Continental, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 476 (D. Del. 1988). 
90. BNS. 683 F. Supp. at 468. 
91. 683 F. Supp. at 470. 
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went beyond Indiana's in empowering target company management, 
and thus might be vulnerable to the implicit substantive dimension of 
the CTS preemption analysis,92 it could not determine how much ad-
vantage the statute gave to management.93 The inability to do so 
reveals the paradox in extending the prevailing management-empow-
erment philosophy of corporation statutes to antitakeover laws. The 
market for corporate control normally constrains and channels the 
broad managerial discretion provided by modern corporation statutes 
toward shareholder well-being. The potency of this extra-legal capital-
market check on management stems from its traditional immunity 
from dilution by state corporation law. Business combination statutes, 
however, ironically subject those very market forces to manageri~l 
interference. 
The court appeared to appreciate this paradox. While speaking the 
more accommodating language of shareholder protection, the Dela-
ware court appeared unwilling to commit itself to that reading of the 
Williams Act, perhaps seeing that its proshareholder interpretation of 
the Delaware statute, if extended far enough, is as disingenuous as was 
the CTS Court's view of the Indiana law. Accordingly, in both deci-
sions the court tempered its blessing of Delaware's management-em-
powerment statute by suggesting that, in any event, the law preserved 
a sufficient degree of shareholder autonomy to be constitutional. 94 In 
this regard, the court gave great weight to the statutory exception for 
tender offers that result in holdings of eighty-five percent or more. Be-
cause this exception supposedly allows a body of determined share-
holders to facilitate a takeover even in the face of management 
opposition, the court stated that it preserves a "meaningful opportu-
nity" for a hostile tender offer to succeed.95 In relying on this stan-
dard for assessing the statute's constitutionality, the court struggled 
against substantial evidence that this contingency is largely chimerical 
because, as the SEC argued in both cases, few tender offers achieve 
eighty-five percent acceptance regardless of target company manage-
ment's attitude.96 In the end, this alternative basis for the court's 
92. 683 F. Supp. at 470; see supra text accompanying notes 53-55. 
93. 683 F. Supp. at 470; see also Staley Continental, 686 F. Supp. at 481-82. 
94. BNS. 683 F. Supp. at 470; Staley Continental, 686 F. Supp. at 485. 
95. BNS. 683 F. Supp. at 469; Staley Continental, 686 F. Supp. at 485. In BNS. the court 
recognized that the other statutory exceptions, which require board approval, see supra text ac-
companying notes 58-59, "might well be illusory." 683 F. Supp. at 470. 
96. See BNS. 683 F. Supp. at 470. In the second Delaware case, Staley Continental, the SEC 
offered further evidence on this issue, including an affidavit by Dr: Gregg Jarrell, formerly the 
SEC's Chief Economist. The evidence was introduced to demonstrate that the statute's 85% 
threshold is too high to provide a practical means for shareholders to circumvent the statutory 
prohibition. See Staley Continental, 686 F. Supp. at 485; see also supra note 66. 
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holdings, strained and unpersuasive as it is, dramatically underscores 
the current divergent constructions of the Williams Act. As shown 
below,97 it also reveals the futility of referring to legislative intent in 
answering the preemption question, as that question is now being 
framed by takeover participants. 
2. Shareholders Versus Nonshareholders 
The conflicting interpretations of the Williams Act exemplified in 
the Wisconsin and Delaware opinions need to be resolved. However, 
the shareholder autonomy/shareholder protection dichotomy masks a 
deeper interpretive question. As shown more fully below,98 the share-
holder autonomy idea assumes - and indeed is motivated by - a 
particular policy stance toward takeovers, a stance that favors a dy-
naµiic, essentially unregulated market for corporate control. Propo-
nents of a shareholder protection reading likewise seem to take for 
granted that shareholder welfare is the fundamental norm, with the 
argument centering on which approach (procedural autonomy or sub-
stantive protection) is better suited to achievement of that objective. 
Yet instead of a right to unrestricted - or only partially restricted -
tender offer opportunities, shareholder welfare may have a more lim-
ited compass than either side of the debate seems willing to acknowl-
edge. Under this alternative interpretation, shareholders enjoy access 
to tender offer opportunities only if and to the extent that state law has 
made a prior determination that they should have that right. Since 
state law is the source oflaw defining stock rights, that law first defines 
the conditions under which, and the degree to which, shareholders will 
participate in the takeover decisionmaking. For various policy rea-
sons, states may exercise that power in a manner that serves to reduce 
both the frequency of certain kinds of takeovers and the voice of share-
holders in those that do occur. Far from implying a protakeover pol-
icy that overrides conflicting state law, a reading of federal law that 
allows the states freedom to diminish takeover opportunities and 
shareholder voice leaves the crucial policy judgment about the appro-
priateness and frequency of takeovers to the states. Because this as-
pect of the preemption issue raises the important question of the 
relationship between state and federal law on corporate-commercial 
matters, it is more fundamental and important than the narrow debate 
now taking place between the advocates of shareholder autonomy and 
shareholder protection. Yet because both camps seem to share a belief 
97. See infra section 111.B. 
98. See infra Part IV. 
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that the Williams Act represents a definitive shareholder-welfare take-
over policy - differing only on their interpretations of that policy -
their debate obscures rather than sheds light on this important federal-
ism question. Therefore, it is a serious error to focus solely on current 
formulations of the preemption debate, while failing to address the un-
derlying question of whether the Williams Act is correctly interpreted 
as embodying a federal takeover policy at all, much less a protakeover 
policy. 
Given the nonshareholder protection motivations for state legisla-
tion, it is strange that the preemption issue is phrased in terms of two 
contrasting approaches to shareholder welfare (shareholder autonomy 
versus shareholder protection) rather than in terms of whether the 
Williams Act requires state takeover laws to adopt a shareholder wel-
fare policy at all. In other words, does the Williams Act exclude state 
leeway to recognize and protect the interests of various nonsharehold-
ers adversely affected by rampant takeover activity? CTS did not con-
sider this question because the Court uncritically discussed the statute 
as shareholder-empowering and refused to acknowledge the constitu-
tional significance of the Indiana legislature's desire to protect local 
economic interests at the expense of nonresident shareholders.99 
The Wisconsin decision discussed above100 likewise did not address 
this question. Even though the Wisconsin court appreciated the dis-
ruptive effect of takeovers on nonshareholder constituencies, 101 those 
interests did not inform its preemption analysis. Instead, the court 
based its analysis on a reading of the Williams Act as a shareholder 
autonomy statute and used the rhetoric of shareholder property rights 
as a basis for its insistence on self-determination. The decision seems 
to- imply rejection of the claim that states may sacrifice shareholder 
access to tender offer opportunities for the sake of local non-
shareholder interests. However, even under the court's premises, such 
a policy choice might still be acceptable. 
Suppose a state law specifies that tender offers might proceed ac-
cording to whether they are expected to affect nonshareholders ad-
versely. Reading the Williams Act as embodying an overarching 
proshareholder policy - whether by means of shareholder autonomy 
or shareholder protection - would mean that in 1968 Congress meant 
to prohibit states from passing such a law. Alternatively, however, 
one might argue that the Wisconsin court's shareholder autonomy 
99. See supra text accompanying notes 46-52. 
100. See supra text following note 87. 
101. See RTE Corp. v. Mark IV Indus., No. 88-C-378, slip op. at 6-8 (E.D. Wis. May 6, 
1988). 
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reading of the Williams Act applies only in situations in which state 
law has made a prior determination that tender offerors should have 
unfiltered access to shareholders. In those situations, management (or 
others) may not interfere; shareholders must decide the bids' fate in 
accordance with state-established procedures. But, whether and how 
often tender offers occur may be influenced by the states according to 
their own calculations of costs and benefits, taking into account share-
holder interests if and to the extent they choose to do so. Again, this 
issue turns on the deeper question of the reach of the states' traditional 
jurisdiction over corporate internal affairs and whether, pursuant to 
that jurisdiction, they can curtail shareholder opportunities to receive 
tender offers in order to further other interests.102 
The Delaware federal court also did not address this issue when 
assessing Delaware's takeover statute. 103 Like the Wisconsin court, its 
approach to the preemption question does not imply a view one way or 
the other on the nonshareholder protection issue. Whether the court's 
shareholder protection reading of the Williams Act implies a constitu-
tional right of access to tender offer opportunities, even where per-
ceived to be harmful to nonshareholders, depends on whether 
management's power to participate in the takeover decisionmaking 
process must be exercised solely for the benefit of shareholders. If the 
oft-cited federal "investor protection" policy is not as pervasive as par-
ticipants in the preemption debate seemingly assume, it may accom-
modate the desire of states to temper a general managerial duty to 
protect shareholders with a grant of authority to consider non-
shareholder concerns in certain situations. 
Supporters of takeover statutes, because they fall into the trap of 
reading the Williams Act as reflecting a pervasive federal protakeover 
and proshareholder policy, have found themselves defending state 
102. The deeper question arises under both state common law principles and statutory law, 
supra note 86, and raises the preemption issue with respect to common law doctrine as well as 
antitakeover statutes. See supra note 20. 
103. One might hesitate to consider nonshareholder protection as a motivation for Dela· 
ware's statute. The significance of nonshareholder interests in Delaware's statute certainly differs 
from that in Wisconsin's and others'. Few Delaware corporations conduct significant operations 
within the state, so protection of local stakeholders like employees, creditors, and the like would 
not seem to be a useful explanation for the statute's motivation. Nevertheless, out·of-state firms 
incorporated in Delaware, concerned about such matters, may have expressed their concerns 
during the legislative process. Such views would not be lightly disregarded because Delaware's 
citizens stand to lose significant revenues in the form of franchise fees if firms reincorporate 
elsewhere in order to take advantage of more favorable antitakeover legislation. Franchise reve-
nues represent 17% of Delaware's gross revenues. BNS Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458, 
473 n.31 (D. Del. 1988). Defections would also adversely affect Delaware's corporate bar. Thus, 
while not as dramatic as the concerns underlying the actions of the mid western industrial states, 
for example, nonshareholder interests probably were not absent from the minds of Delaware's 
legislators as they considered and enacted its antitakeover statute. 
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statutes in terms of shareholder welfare rather than defending the le-
gitimacy of state efforts to realize broader objectives. Not only are 
such shareholder welfare arguments transparently false, they mislead 
courts and result in either the superficial analysis of CTS or the tor-
tured reasoning of the recent Delaware decisions. Such duplicity, 
while understandable in a culture and body of law according capital 
providers special status, impedes grappling with the constitutionality 
of state protectionist actions in an informed and straightforward man-
ner. Moreover, a legal stratagem of hypocrisy by those who favor 
state antitakeover action is unnecessary. It is founded, as are the pre-
emption arguments of their adversaries, on a reading of the Williams 
Act that is historically inaccurate. 
II. THE WILLIAMS ACT AND ITS CONTEXT 
A. The Limited Objectives of the Williams Act 
Congress passed the Williams Act104 in 1968 in order to amend 
certain sections of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.105 The Wil-
liams Act, as amended, does several things. First, a person or a group 
whose acquisitions of stock result in beneficial ownership of more than 
five percent of a class of an issuer's equity security, registered under 
Section 12 of the Exchange Act, is required to file a Schedule 130 
within ten days of the acquisition. Filings must be made with the 
SEC, with the issuer of the stock, and with each exchange on which 
the stock is traded. Among other things, Schedule 130 requires dis-
closure of the purchasers' identity and purpose. If the Schedule is filed 
by a corporation, the same disclosure must also be made for each exec-
utive officer and dire9tor of the corporation.106 
Second, a bidder making a "tender offer" (a term not defined in the 
Exchange Act)107 must file a Schedule 140-1 with the SEC on the date 
of the commencement of the tender offer. A copy of the Schedule 
140-1 must also be delivered to the target company and to any other 
bidder who has filed a Schedule 140-1 and whose offer has not yet 
terminated. 108 A different schedule, 13E-4, must be filed by a target 
company responding with a tender offer for its own securities.109 Both 
schedules require the bidder to disclose specified information about 
104. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e) & 78n(d)-(f) (1982). 
105. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-kk (1982). 
106. See Reg. 130, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-l to .13d-101 (1988). 
107. See Hanson Trust v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 54 (2d Cir. 1985). 
108. See Reg. 140, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14d-1 to .14d-101 (1988). 
109. See Rule 13e-1 and Schedule 13E-4, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13e-1 & 240.13e-101 (1988). 
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itself, its source of funds, the purpose of its offer, and any plans or 
proposals relating to material changes or transactions involving the 
target company. 
Third, any person (including, most importantly, the target com-
pany) who makes a solicitation or recommendation for target com-
pany security holders to accept or reject a tender offer must file 
Schedule 14D-9. Schedule 14D-9 requires the target company to state 
the reasons for its recommendation and to disclose any recent trading 
in its stock by its executive officers and directors. 110 Without filing 
Schedule 14D-9, a target company may issue a "stop-look-and-listen" 
communication to its security holders requesting that they defer their 
decision on the tender offer until advised of the target company's 
position. 111 
Fourth, besides implementing provisions aimed at transmitting in-
formation to shareholders, the Williams Act and related SEC regula-
tions establish procedural guidelines governing the conduct of tender 
offers. Offers must remain open for at least twenty business days. 112 
Shareholders who tender their stock may withdraw it during the first 
fifteen business days of the tender offer or, if the offerer has not al-
ready purchased their stock, may withdraw it within sixty days of the 
offer's commencement. 113 If more shares are tendered than the offerer 
seeks to purchase, it must purchase from all tendering shareholders on 
a pro rata basis. 114 If, having announced a tender offer, the bidder 
later raises the price it is willing to pay, it must pay that higher price 
to all tendering shareholders, including those who tendered before the 
price increase. 115 Finally, material misstatements or omissions and 
fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices in connection 
with tender offers are prohibited. 116 
As a method for gaining control of a corporation despite manage-
ment opposition, tender offers were still a relatively new development 
when Congress began to consider subjecting them to federal regula-
tion. Previously, would-be hostile insurgents relied principally upon 
open market purchases of stock or sought to attain voting control 
through proxy contests. 117 During the early 1960s, however, the 
110. See Reg. 14D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14d-9 to .14d-101 (1988). 
111. See Rule 14d-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-9(e) (1988). 
112. Rule 14e-l(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(a) (1988). 
113. Rule 14d-7, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7 (1988). 
114. Rule 14d-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-8 (1988). 
115. See Rule 14d-10(a)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10(a)(2) (1988). 
116. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982); Rule 14e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1988); see Schreiber v. 
Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985). 
117. As stated by the Supreme Court of Delaware: "In the days when Che.If [1964], Bennett 
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tender offer emerged as an alternative device for wresting control from 
incumbent management and, by 1967, had sharply increased in fre-
quency.118 As a weapon for ousting target management, the tender 
offer provided a distinct advantage over the proxy contest. Rather 
than relying on high-sounding promises of "better management" in 
the future, the hostile bidder proffered something tangible and imme-
diate: cash - including a substantial premium over prevailing market 
price. Moreover, since prior to enactment of the Williams Act no fil-
ing or disclosure requirements applied, the tender offer also provided 
the tactical advantages of surprise and secrecy, thereby avoiding the 
delay and disclosure obstacles associated with proxy contests.119 
As with any newly emerging social phenomenon, takeovers did not 
fit easily into then-existing modes of intellectual discourse, and, there-
fore, during the period leading up to the adoption of the Williams Act 
in 1968, various conflicting attitudes toward tender offers were promi-
nent. Some regarded target corporations as unsuspecting prey needing 
protection from unwelcome (and undesirable) attacks by so-called 
"corporate raiders." Thus, in 1965 Senator Williams introduced legis-
lation aimed at deterring tender offers in order to protect incumbent 
managements.120 The SEC did not support that bill because of the 
legislation's decidedly promanagement slant. 121 Eventually, Senator 
Williams introduced a more balanced bill, but at the time even this 
was seen by some critics as an antitakeover measure. 122 Indeed, the 
co-sponsor of the bill, Senator Kuchel, introduced the measure by re-
ferring to the threat that "corporate raiders" pose to "our proudest 
businesses."123 Thus, quite apart from the statute's design or ultimate 
effect on the level of takeover activity, in the mid-1960s some politi-
cians hoped, and some observers believed, that the bill would reduce 
[1962], Martin [1952], and Kors [1960] were decided, the tender offer, while not an unknown 
device, was virtually unused. . . . Then, the favored attack of a raider was stock acquisition 
followed by a proxy contest." Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 957 (Del. 
1985). 
118. In 1966, there were more than 100 tender offers; in 1960, only eight. SENATE COMM. 
ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, FULL DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE EQUITY OWNERSHIP AND 
IN CORPORATE TAKEOVER BIDS, s. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967) [hereinafter 
SEN. REPORT]. The total dollar value of such offers increased from $186 million in 1960 to 
nearly one billion dollars in 1965. Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 54. 
119. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
120. See 111 CONG. REC. 28,257 (1965) (statement of Sen. Williams). 
121. For example, the bill included a provision requiring bidders to notify target company 
management before launching a bid. 
122. See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 165-66 ("the benefits will run to ineffective 
management"). 
123. See 113 CONG. REC. 857-58, 8236-37 (1967); Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 43. 
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the frequency of hostile bids or at least alter the legal landscape to the 
advantage of target companies. 
Co-existing with concerns about "raiders" were voices trumpeting 
the many benefits of takeovers. Professor Manne's seminal paper on 
the utility of tender offers and of an active market for corporate con-
trol had just appeared in 1965,124 and it provided the intellectual foun-
dation for arguments in favor of takeover activity. This view, 
particularly as embellished by later adherents, emphasized the impor-
tance of the threat of hostile takeovers as a management accountabil-
ity mechanism and as a central feature of a market-oriented model of 
corporate activity and corporation law. Manne argued that, since cap-
ital markets are efficient, suboptimal managerial performance would 
be reflected in reduced share prices. Discounted share prices would 
invite tender offers by those seeking to profit from replacing incum-
bent management and realizing a corporation's full economic poten-
tial. The existence of a vigorous, properly functioning market for 
corporate control would immediately benefit shareholders by offering 
the prospect of stock premiums. Moreover, shareholders would gain 
over the longer term because the threat of takeover would encourage 
managerial diligence. Furthermore, the bidder's direct financial ap-
peal to target shareholders made the tender offer a much more potent 
takeover device than the proxy contest, in which shareholders might 
only dimly perceive how granting a proxy to insurgents would actually 
improve their economic welfare, and in which management enjoyed 
inherent legal and collective action advantages owing to its control of 
the proxy machinery. In addition to citing the wealth and governance 
benefits of takeovers to capital providers, Manne touted the purported 
benefits of takeovers to society in general. He argued that an effec-
tively functioning market for corporate control rechannels corporate 
assets into the hands of those most able and willing to maximize their 
value. The result would be a more efficient use of limited economic 
resources, by which everyone - not merely shareholders - would 
benefit. 125 
124. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control 73 J. POL. EcoN. 110 (1965) 
[hereinafter Manne, Mergers]; see also Manne, Tender Offers & the Free Market, 2 MERGERS & 
ACQUISITIONS 91 (1966). 
125. In several respects, linking shareholder benefits and societal welfare in this manner was, 
and remains, an intellectual tour de force. First, seemingly diverse interests are reconciled. Take-
overs are not simply an amusing and lucrative pastime for capital owners, but are good for other 
groups - and economic classes - as well. Avoiding charges of special interest favoritism is 
critically important to any effort to address a high-stakes economic issue in a democratic polity 
eschewing visible class privilege. Second, this accommodation of interests takes place without-
indeed is disserved by - governmental intervention or planning. Instead of depending on a 
misguided public altruism, the greater good is served, as always in neo-classical economic theory, 
by each economic actor egoistically pursuing his or her own private gain. Thus, at least in the 
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As Congress deliberated, it was alerted to the larger economic im-
plications of hostile takeover activity, as well as its effects on corporate 
accountability and shareholder wealth, through testimony at commit-
tee hearings.126 The legislative history reveals that Congress took no 
definite position either way in this debate, neither embracing nor de-
nouncing the recent phenomenon. This was the unmistakable conclu-
sion expressed in both the House and Senate Reports on the bill. 
It was strongly urged during the hearings that takeover bids should not 
be discouraged because they serve a useful purpose in providing a check 
on entrenched but inefficient management. It was also recognized that 
these bids are made for many other reasons, and do not always reflect a 
desire to improve the management of the company .... [The bill] avoids 
tipping the balance of regulation either in favor of management or in 
favor of the person making the takeover bid.127 
Senator Williams repeatedly made the same point on the Senate 
floor. 128 Thus, SEC Chairman Cohen was merely echoing congres-
sional sentiment when he stated that "[t]he Commission does not be-
lieve that any bill should be adopted which would either encourage or 
discourage takeover bids, nor does the Commission want to be in-
volved in any way in passing upon the merits or conditioning the 
terms of [particular] takeover bids."129 
Taking no position with respect to the larger policy issue of 
economic sphere, the age-old dilemma of squaring individual appetite with community good is 
neatly solved. Third, dissolving possible conflict between private and social good in this manner 
depends on an acceptable measure of social welfare. That provided in the takeover arena is the 
one generally provided by economists: efficiency. It was indisputable that more efficient uses of 
resources are, other things equal, preferable to less efficient uses.' Fourth, having chosen effi-
ciency as the measure of good, some workable mechanism for measuring changes in the level of 
efficiency is needed. Share price behavior provided the perfect answer, since readily ascertainable 
movements in securities prices are capital-market surrogates for the direct measure of efficiency 
gains or losses in the deployment of corporate assets. This last ingredient in the linkage of pri-
vate gain and public good has come under attack, as has the narrowness of the efficiency crite-
rion. As a result, questions about political and social values as well as abstruse economic theory 
are implicated in this protakeover position. 
126. Witnesses expressing generally favorable views about takeovers included Professor Sa-
muel Hayes, see Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 56-57 (typical target firms managed inef-
ficiently); Professor Robert Mundheim, see id. at 115 (same); and Stanley F. Reed, editor and 
publisher of Mergers and Acquisitions, see id. at 165 (bill "could cause positive harm to share-
holder interest by eliminating what Professor Manne calls the 'free market in corporate con-
trol'"). The most vocal critic of takeovers was the bill's sponsor, Senator Kuchel. See supra text 
accompanying note 123. Professor Kaplan professed uncertainty about whether tender offers 
warranted regulation. See Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 134-35. 
127. SEN. REPORT, supra note 118, at 3; see also HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOR-
EIGN COMMERCE, DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE EQUITY OWNERSHIP, H.R. REP. No. 1711, 
90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2811, 2813 [hereinaf-
ter HOUSE REPORT]. 
128. See 113 CONG. REC. 854-55, 856, 24,664, 24,665 (1967). 
129. Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 178; see also id. at 16, 25, 188. The Senate hearings 
transcript includes a speech to the same effect given by Cohen to the New York City Bar Associ-
ation. Id. at 203-06. 
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whether tender offers should be encouraged or discouraged, Congress 
instead pursued the narrower aim of attempting to "close a significant 
gap in investor protection under the Federal securities laws."130 One 
"gap" in legal coverage identified by supporters of the legislation con-
cerned the similarity of tender offers to proxy contests as devices for 
seizing control from incumbent management.131 With each, share-
holders were required to decide whether to shift their loyalties from 
management to a challenger. To promote informed shareholder 
choice, federal disclosure requirements applied to proxy solicita-
tions.132 For the same reason they ought to, but prior to 1968 did not, 
apply to tender offers as well. 
Supporters identified another "gap" by drawing an analogy be-
tween a target company shareholder and a prospective investor in a 
new firm. Faced with a cash tender offer, the shareholder could either 
sell or retain his or her stock. If the latter course were chosen and the 
bidder succeeded in its offer anyway, the shift in control to the bidder 
would mean that the shareholder was now an investor in what soon 
c,ould be a very different firm. This choice between sale (exit) and re-
tention (new investment) was likened both to the existing share-
holder's decision to accept an exchange tender offer and to a 
prospective shareholder's decision to invest in a new stock issue. 133 
Since exchange offers and new issues were subject to federal securities 
law disclosure requirements, so the argument went, cash tender offers 
should be too. This point was particularly apt during the mid-1960s 
because cash-out mergers were quite new and thus nontendering 
shareholders might fully expect to remain as investors in the corpora-
tion. The analogies on which this "gap-filling" rationale is based 
might be criticized because a bidder's very success depends on the exit 
of a large number of target shareholders rather than on their "re-in-
vestment." Nonetheless, there was an appealing symmetry to man-
dated disclosure by cash tender offerors on the one hand, and proxy 
solicitors, exchange offerors, and new issuers on the other. There was 
also a vague sense that "secret" raids were unseemly, and that in-
130. 113 CONG. REC. 854 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Williams). The idea of closing a "gap" is 
referred to repeatedly in the Williams Act's legislative history. See, e.g., 113 CONG. REC. 24,664, 
24,665 (1967); SEN. REPORT, supra note 118, at 2-3, 4; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 127, at 2812-
13, 2814; Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 1, 3, 15, 16, 42, 49, 123, 147, 182; see also Cohen, 
Takeover Bids, 2 MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 87 (1966); Cohen, A Note on Takeover Bids and 
Corporate Purchases of Stock, 22 Bus. LAW. 149 (1966). 
131. See 113 CONG. REC. 855, 9340, 24,664, 24,665 (1967); SEN. REPORT, supra note 118, at 
2-3; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 127, at 2812-13; Senate Hearings, supra note I, at 19, 20-21. 
132. See supra note 82. 
133. See 113 CONG. REC. 855, 24,664 (1967); SEN. REPORT, supra note 118, at 2-3; HOUSE 
REPORT, supra note 127, at 2812-13; Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 18-19. 
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formed investors were better off than uninformed ones so that there 
was nothing to lose by requiring certain additional disclosures. 134 
Besides filling a gap in the federal securities law disclosure regime, 
the Williams Act also sought to provide target company shareholders 
with limited procedural protections in response to unique features of 
tender offer campaigns. Supporters of the legislation expressed con-
cern that the typical bid might create pressures to ten~er in situations 
in which an informed analysis might counsel otherwise. 135 For exam-
ple, the shareholder faced with a "first-come, first-served" partial offer 
might doubt the bidder's ability to pay for all stock tendered and 
therefore might tender early at the initial price rather than waiting for 
a higher bid. Toward that objective, the statute imposed certain pro-
cedural rules designed to protect shareholders from the pressure to 
make hurried and ill-considered decisions.136 
In the end, confronted by the surge in cash tender offer activity 
and, however uncertain about the public policy ramifications of this 
novel and still-unfolding phenomenon, Congress was persuaded that 
its general exemption from federal regulation was not good. The Wil-
liams Act did not, however, represent a pervasive, all-encompassing 
articulation of a federal takeover policy. Manne's theoretical argu-
ments in favor of tender offers found no endorsement by Congress. 137 
Rather, the Williams Act addressed specific legal deficiencies in the 
then-current scheme of federal securities regulation. Thus, Congress 
modestly amended that scheme in a manner consistent with the under-
lying philosophy of federal securities regulation: to require disclosure 
in situations where fairness to shareholders seems to warrant it. 138 
The gap-filling aim, limited ambition, and policy agnosticism of the 
Williams Act are critical to the meaning of the statute's oft-cited twin 
policies of "investor protection" and "neutrality." Of course, the aim 
of the statute was "investor protection" in the obvious sense that tar-
get company shareholders were the intended beneficiaries of the legis-
lation.139 After all, they were the on~s to receive the newly mandated 
134. See 113 CONG. REC. 857-58, 9338, 24,664, 24,665 (1967); Senate Hearings, supra note 1, 
42-43, 48-49. 
135. See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note l, at 15, 17. 
136. See supra text accompanying notes 112-15. 
137. This is not surprising since Manne himself stated that "[t]he study of the economics of 
the market for corporate control is still in its infancy." Manne, Mergers, supra note 124, at 120. 
138. "The purpose of the Williams Act is to insure that public shareholders who are con-
fronted by a cash tender offer for their stock will not be required to respond without adequate 
information .... " Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975); see R. CLARK, 
CORPORATE LAW 366, 719-20 (1986) (disclosure philosophy of Securities Act of 1933 and Sec-
tion 14 of Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
139. See, e.g., SEN. REPORT, supra note 118, at 3-4. 
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disclosures, and to enjoy the procedural safeguards. It is a dangerous 
mistake, however, to conclude that the specific, relatively narrow 
shareholder protections that Congress provided were part of some 
larger, well-conceived, and theoretically coherent federal policy that 
defines investor "protection" in terms of an unlimited right of access 
to tender offer opportunities. Likewise, it is an error to read Congress' 
so-called "policy of neutrality" - its express desire not to upset the 
then-existing "balance" between bidders and target company manage-
ment, or to favor bidders or target company management in takeover 
contests140 - as reflecting a policy judgment about the appropriate 
level of takeover activity or the role of the states in regulating that 
activity. Instead, Congress' disavowal was a caution regarding the 
limited nature of its action, imposing limited disclosure and proce-
dural safeguards but refusing to take sides in the controversial debate 
over whether takeovers should be discouraged or encouraged. Con-
gress was declining to act so as to favor the claims of either target 
company management or would-be tender offerors. It is revealing in 
this respect to recall Senator Williams' famous statement that forms 
the basis of the supposed twin policies: 
I have taken extreme care with this legislation to balance the scales 
equally to protect the legitimate interests of the corporation, manage-
ment, and shareholders without unduly impeding cash takeover bids. 
Every effort has been made to avoid tipping the balance of regulatory 
burden in favor of management or in favor of the offeror. The purpose 
of this bill is to require full and fair disclosure for the benefit of stock-
holders while at the same time providing the offeror and management 
equal opportunity to fairly present their case.141 
Thus, "investor protection," properly understood in its narrow 1968 
meaning, is a congressional policy, but only about disclosure to share-
holders by the principal antagonists in the takeover battle. It does not 
reflect an affirmative, integrated federal policy based on an immutable 
conception of the appropriate roles of bidders, target company man-
agement, and shareholders in hostile takeovers. 
In short, confronted with sharply conflicting and unresolved views 
about the desirability of tender offers, Congress took no position on 
whether to hinder or promote takeover activity, or whether a certain 
level of takeover activity was desirable. It expressly disclaimed any 
desire to make it easier or harder for bidders to succeed, or to impede 
140. The legislative history contains several statements by supporters of the bill expressing 
the view that it was not intended to upset the "balance" or tip the "scales" between the contend-
ing parties. See 113 CONG. REC. 854, 24,664 (1967); Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 25, 64. 
The characterization of this approach as a "policy of neutrality" appears in Piper v. Chris-Craft 
Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 29 (1977). See also Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 633 (1982). 
141. 113 CONG. REC. 854-55 (1967). 
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or enhance shareholder opportunities to receive tender offers. It said 
nothing about precluding states from acting. Instead, Congress sought 
simply to make sure that target company shareholders would have suf-
ficient disclosure and procedural protection to respond rationally if 
and when tender offers occurred. In the words of a distinguished com-
mentator writing in 1970, "federal securities regulation cf takeovers is 
developing, incomplete, and uncertain in its, requirements."142 Be-
cause it was true in 1968 and because the premises of the Williams Act 
have not been materially altered, that description of the statute's mod-
est compass continues to be true today. 
B. The Williams Act's Context 
Having surveyed the original objectives of the Williams Act, we 
turn now to three basic assumptions about state corporation law and 
the character of hostile takeovers that helped form the context within 
which Congress passed the statute. We focus' on these elements be-
cause they represent important background assumptions that are no 
longer valid. Appreciation of the intellectual and legal context and 
how it has changed reveals why the Williams Act is of such limited 
relevance to the problems that takeovers present today. 
1. Shareholder Autonomy with Respect to Stock Alienation 
In 1968, Congress relied on certain basic assumptions about how 
tender offers were typically conducted to address the tender offer phe-
nomenon. A hallmark of state corporation law was its recognition of 
the shareholder's right to make his or her own determination about 
when and to whom to sell stock. Corporation statutes at that time 
allowed articles of incorporation, bylaws, or shareholder agreements 
to impose reasonable restrictions on alienation, 143 and common law 
imposed certain limitations on sales by controlling shareholders.144 
Nevertheless, the individual shareholder's right to decide whether and 
when to sell stock was a fundamental principle of state corporation 
law, a principle assumed in the 1960s to be fully applicable to the 
tender offer context.145 
142. Shipman, Some Thoughts About the Role of State Takeover Legislation: The Ohio Take-
over Act, 21 CAS~ w. RES. L. REV. 722, 760 (1970). 
143. See, e.g., DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 202 (1983); Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., 2 
N.Y.2d 534, 161 N.Y.S.2d 418 (1957); Colbert v. Hennessey, 351 Mass. 131, 217 N.E.2d 914 
(1966). 
144. See, e.g., Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cerL denied, 349 U.S. 952 
(1955); Gerdes v. Reynolds, 28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1941). . 
145. Statements occur throughout the Williams Act's legislative history indicating that con-
temporaries simply took for granted that shareholders (rather than some other group or entity) 
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Today, we are accustomed to reading about target management's 
deployment of "poison pills," "shark repellents," "lock-up options," 
"white knights," and other colorfully labelled defensive "showstop-
pers. "146 The purpose of such tactics is to prevent a stock purchase 
offer from getting to the shareholders at all - that is, to deny share-
holders an opportunity to exercise their historically unquestioned right 
to decide whether to sell to a hostile bidder. Subject to certain impor-
tant qualifications, such practices are generally lawful 147 and can be 
highly effective. 148 In 1968, however, target management's ability to 
block hostile tender offers was in its infancy. Because corporate law-
yers had not yet devised the sophisticated weapons of the 1980s, the 
possibilities were very limited and appear quaint by today's stan-
dards.149 The only potentially effective blocking tactic used in 1968, 
with case law support, was the defensive stock repurchase. Faced with 
a threat to its control, management might use corporate funds to buy 
the hostile bidder's block of stock at a premium or simply to purchase 
other shares on the open market in order to "thin out" the market. 
However, as a means by which target company management might 
block unwelcome overtures, the defensive repurchase was not entirely 
effective. The bidder could simply refuse the buy-out offer and con-
tinue its appeal to the shareholders, either in open market purchases 
or via a tender offer. Further, corporate stock repurchases were sub-
ject to criticism precisely because "shareholders are, in effect, deprived 
of a choice between the conflicting policies and personalities when cor-
porate funds can be used to purchase enough shares to make it impos-
sible for the outsider to gain the control he seeks."150 In any event, 
repurchases from hostile bidders - now labeled "greenmail" - were 
used infrequently during the 1960s.151 
would decide the fate of tender offers through their individual decisions to tender or hold their 
stock. Disclosure requirements would simply augment that key feature of the process. See 113 
CONG. REC. 855, 9340, 24,664 (1967); SEN. REPORT, supra note 118, at 2, 3; HOUSE REPORT, 
supra note 127, at 2812, 2813; Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 15, 16, 17, 64, 97, 156, 184. 
146. For definitions of these and other devices, see L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES 
REGULATION 499-502 (2d ed. Supp. 1988). See also Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Corp., 493 
A.2d 946, 957 (Del. 1985) (describing development and judicial sanction of growing array of 
defensive measures). 
147. See, e.g., Moran v. Household Intl., Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985); Unocal, 493 A.2d 
946. 
148. See, e.g., supra note 66. 
149. See Schmults & Kelly, Cash Takeover Bids-Defense Tactics, 23 Bus. LAW. 115 (1967) 
(describing three general lines of defense with scant recitation of judicial authority validating the 
tactics described); see also Fleischer & Mundheim, Corporate Acquisition by Tender Offer, 115 U. 
PA. L. REV. 317 (1967). 
150. Fleischer & Mundheim, supra note 149, at 365. 
151. Greenmail was a rare phenomenon until recently. See Macey & McChesney,A Theoret-
ical Analysis of Corporate Greenmail 95 YALE L.J. 13, 13 (1985). 
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Besides defensive stock repurchases, there was little else target 
company management could do. It might, for example, try to influ-
ence the market for target company shares by enlisting friendly outsid-
ers to purchase target stock; this could bid up the stock price and 
thereby discourage an insurgent by raising its acquisition costs. 152 
Such tactics, however distorting and then lacking in articulable justifi-
cation, were entirely consistent with the reigning state law principle of 
free stock alienability. Even if they succeeded in fending off a hostile 
offeror, their very success depended ultimately on target shareholders 
deciding for themselves whether to sell their stock. Thus, even where 
target company management opposed a hostile tender offer and sought 
to take steps to block its consummation, its conduct generally left tar-
get company shareholders witJ:i the final power to decide whether and 
when to sell their stock. 
In the mid-1960s, target company management played a much 
more limited role, both in legal theory and in practice, in the typical 
tender offer than it does today; success or failure of an offer was as-
sumed to rest with shareholders. Indeed, it. was the would-be ac-
quirer's ability to sidestep management and appeal directly to the 
shareholders that gave the tender offer its awesome force. Accord-
ingly, the Williams Act's disclosure requirements reflect concern that 
target company management may attempt to discourage tenders by 
distributing misleading information to shareholders.153 Again, how-
ever, such defensive tactics by target companies and the congressional 
response simply assumed - indeed were premised on - shareholders 
having the ultimate voice in takeover contests as a result of their stock 
disposition power. In mandating a policy of informed choice, Con-
gress acted to improve the flow of information so as to make the 
choice more informed. It did not consider whether federal law was 
needed to facilitate choice as such, however; the latter, a then-unques-
tioned attribute of share ownership provided by state law, was simply 
taken for granted. 
2. Shareholder Wealth Maximization as the Primary Object of 
Corporation Law 
In 1968, legal and economic orthodoxy placed shareholder welfare 
at the center of corporation law and corporate purpose. State corpora-
tion law - statutory and common law - assumed that corporations 
would be run primarily for the shareholders' :financial benefit. Ac-
152. Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 196. 
153. See id. at 183. 
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cording to the classic expression of this principle, management was 
not permitted to sacrifice this objective to other values or policy 
preferences. 
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the 
profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be em-
ployed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be exercised in the 
choice of means to attain that end and does not extend to a change in the 
end itself, to reduction of profits or to the nondistribution of profits 
among stockholders in order to devote them to other purposes. 154 
That basic idea, articulated as early as 1919, continued to shape state 
corporation law in the 1960s. At least in theory, state statutory and 
common law proscribed conduct by management that deviated from 
that nonnative principle.155 Statutes limited the extent to which cor-
porations might make charitable contributions or otherwise devote re-
sources to uses that would not redound to the shareholders' financial 
benefit. 156 Courts interpreted directors' fiduciary duties of care and 
loyalty as precluding conduct that could not be justified, however 
weakly, as congruent with the interests of the "corporation and its 
shareholders." 157 
Conventional economic thinking generally took for granted this fo. 
cus on shareholder welfare. It underlay Manne's analysis of hostile 
takeovers, for example, and it continues today as a central tenet in 
much of the commentary on takeovers. 158 Various justifications for 
the principle of shareholder primacy have been offered. 159 Departure 
from that principle is thought to discourage investment in corporate 
enterprise. Financial returns to shareholders would decline, theorists 
warned; moreover, given the modern corporation's separation of own-
ership from control, and the nagging accountability and legitimacy 
154. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 507, 170 N.W. 668, 684 (1919). 
155. See Selheimer v. Manganese Corp., 423 Pa. 563, 224 A.2d 634 (1966); Litwin v. Allen, 
25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup. Ct. 1940). 
156. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(9) (1983); see Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 
A.2d 398 (Del. Ch. 1969) (power limited to reasonable amounts). 
157. Delaware has defined the board's fiduciary duty as owed not merely to the shareholders 
but to the corporation as well. See supra note 81. The meaning of the distinction - if indeed it 
is a distinction - has never been explained. Instead, Delaware's jurisprudence has traditionally 
assumed that the interests of the corporation, on the one hand, and the shareholders, on the 
other, coincide. Corporate takeovers threaten the continued validity of that assumption because 
the interests of the corporation as a whole - including various nonshareholders - will diverge 
from those of shareholders in a bust-up bid. See Johnson, Corporate Takeovers and Corporations: 
Who are They For?, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 781 (1986). 
158. Most scholarship about corporate takeovers uncritically accepts the shareholder pri-
macy norm as given. Analysis then focuses on the extent to which particular rules or behavior 
promote or detract from that value. See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 63; Easterbrook & Fischel, 
supra note 10; Gilson, supra note 18; Romano, supra note 8. 
159. See Johnson, supra note 13, at 40-41. 
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problems that this separation generates, the shareholder primacy norm 
was considered necessary to provide a clear benchmark against which 
the performance of powerful corporate management might be as-
sessed.160 An even more basic concern was that, because the share-
holders are the corporation's "owners" or residual risk bearers, 
managerial policies that benefit others at shareholders' expense repre-
sent an illegitimate transfer of wealth from its rightful claimants to 
some third party. 161 Finally, the supposed linkage between share-
holder welfare and the general benefits of efficient resource exploita-
tion served to reconcile a seemingly narrow focus for corpo~ate 
endeavor with larger social demands on corporate behavior. ~ 62 
Congress passed the Williams Act against this background of basic 
assumptions about the content and central objective of corporation 
law and corporate activity. The statute says nothing explicit about the 
shareholders' economic or legal position in the corporation, just as it 
says nothing about the power of shareholders to resolve takeover con-
tests by selling or holding their stock. The statute's disclosure and 
procedural protections were designed to operate within the context of 
a state law framework that gave shareholders broad power to dispose 
of stock. Similarly, the preeminence of shareholder economic rights 
was another deeply ingrained element of that context. There was no 
need to shore up that framework; it already existed, and was as taken 
for granted in mainstream economic thought and corporation law as 
the air we breathe. 
3. No Trade-Off Between Shareholder and Nonshareholder Welfare 
In 1968, the immediate goal of the typical hostile takeover was 
replacement of incumbent management. According to the only empir-
ical study that had been conducted, companies that attracted the at-
tention of tender offerors were inefficiently managed firms not 
realizing their full economic potential.163 In theory, this inefficiency 
was reflected in a target company's stock price, which would be lower 
than the company's potential value. A potential acquirer that believed 
itself capable of increasing a target company's efficiency might there-
160. See Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. 
Times, Sept. 13, 1970, at 33 (Magazine); see also Hetherington, Fact and Legal Theory: Share-
holders, Managers, and Corporate Social Responsibility, 21 STAN. L. REV. 248, 280 (1969). 
161. See M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 135 (1982 ed.). 
162. See Eisenberg, Corporate Legitimacy, Conduct, and Governance - Two Models of the 
Corporation, 17 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1, 5 (1983); supra note 125. 
163. Taussig & Hayes, Are Cash Take-Over Bids Unethical?, 23 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 107, 108 
(1967); see also Brudney, A Note on Chilling Tender Solicitations, 21 RUTGERS L. REV. 609, 610 
(1967). 
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fore offer shareholders a premium above current market price in order 
to gain control over the corporation. The reigning assumption was 
that, while the acquirer might consolidate or otherwise alter opera-
tions, the business of the target would continue, more efficiently of 
course, and the buyer would recoup its investment and earn a tidy 
profit. 
The Williams Act's legislative history contains occasional expres-
sions of concern that hostile takeovers might result in lost jobs for 
management, asset liquidations, or other disruptive effects. 164 How-
ever, there is little reference to possible adverse impact on various non-
shareholder interests such as nonmanagement employees, creditors, 
local communities, and the like.165 It is unlikely that such concerns 
could have been significant, because available evidence - of which 
there was extremely little - indicated that "bust-up" takeovers of the 
kind so prevalent in the 1980s were quite rare and, as to those that had 
occurred, no studies of their effects existed.166 In the years preceding 
1968, only a small percentage of tender offers resulted in significant 
asset liquidations. Indeed, the tender offer phenomenon was part of 
the larger wave of conglomerate acquisitions aimed at assembling dis-
parate operations under unitary control.167 The acquirer often re-
placed management, but additional job losses or other dislocations 
were expected to be few. 
To the extent that legislators expressed concern about possible ad-
verse effects of takeovers, the principal object of solicitude seems to 
have been target company shareholders. 168 Other enterprise-depen-
dent interests were not a part of the calculus because they were of no 
direct concern to federal securities law and its narrow focus on pro-
tecting capital providers. Economic orthodoxy and the premises of 
state corporation law likewise eschewed any explicit regard for non-
shareholder interests. Furthermore, for those who saw takeover activ-
ity as promoting overall allocative efficiency, tender offers were a 
vehicle for benefiting rather than threatening noninvestors. Congress 
simply did not approach takeovers with any empirical evidence or 
deeply felt alarm about their disruptive effects. Hence, Congress did 
not consider whether the benefits to shareholders and society generally 
164. See 113 CONG. REC. 857-58, 8236-37, 9338 (1967); Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 43, 
48. 
165. See infra note 168. 
166. See Taussig & Hayes, supra note 163. 
167. See Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 56, 204. 
168. See 113 CONG. REC. 855-56, 24,664 (1967); Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 15, 16, 44, 
57, 178. 
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of a robust market for corporate control might involve substantial 
costs to local interests dependent on the continued existence of target 
corporations. To the Congress of 1968 and to society at large that 
trade-off question had not yet emerged. 
Ill. THE IRRELEVANCE OF THE WILLIAMS ACT 
Before addressing the preemption questions presented in Part I.C 
above, we note in this section that each of the three basic assumptions 
about state corporation law and the character of takeovers just dis-
cussed are no longer valid. Those assumptions formed an integral part 
of the context in which Congress operated when it considered and 
passed the Williams Act in 1968. As the context has changed, how-
ever, new questions about hostile takeovers and state regulation have 
arisen. We will argue below that Congress did not address those ques-
tions and that the Williams Act therefore does not answer them. To 
appreciate how the current preemption controversy poses entirely dif-
ferent policy challenges than those that faced Congress in 1968, we 
first need to see how much the world of takeovers has changed in 
twenty years. 
A. A New Context 
1. The Role of Target Company Management 
Post-1968 developments in state antitakeover statutes169 and state 
common law, as well as the continuing evolution of new defensive 
measures, have dramatically redefined the role of target QOmpany 
management in hostile takeovers. The post-MITE corporatization 
strategy of state statutes has transmuted tender offers into "corporate" 
affairs and thrust management onto center stage, usurping from. target 
shareholders their previous unilateral power to decide a hostile bid's 
success or failure.17° Business combination statutes and Penn-
sylvania's director-approval statute in particular are designed to give 
target company management an effective veto power over hostile 
bids. 171 
The common law has developed a similar promanagement slant 
during the two decades since passage of the Williams Act. Indeed, 
because state antitakeover statutes were. routinely struck down prior to 
169. At the time the Williams Act was passed, only the state of Virginia had passed a take-
over statute. See 1968 Va. Acts ch. 119, §§ 13.1-528 to -540. 
170. See supra Part I.B. 
171. Id. 
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the 1987 CTS decision, 172 up until the Revlon decision and its auction 
mandate, the common law had been an even greater source of comfort 
to target management than statutory law. 173 It is true that, under cer-
tain circumstances at least, common law principles preclude manage-
ment from denying shareholders the opportunity to receive a tender 
offer; in fact, under Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings 174 
and its progeny, Delaware law may even require management to facili-
tate an "auction" of the company.175 However, until the full reach of 
this Revlon duty to auction is delineated, common law will permit 
management to deploy powerful defensive measures to block hostile 
bids. 176 While management must account for how this power is exer-
cised, more strictly now perhaps than in years past, the Delaware 
Supreme Court's Unocal decision177 and similar decisions from other 
jurisdictions178 still allow management to claim the generous protec-
tive mantle of the business judgment rule. Thus, while courts are in-
tensifying their scrutiny of target company blocking measures, for the 
most part post-Unocal formulations of judicial review have not 
changed the fact that defensive behavior continues to be assessed 
against the rather lax standards developed for reviewing manage-
ment's exercise of its fiduciary duties outside the takeover context. 179 
Whatever the underlying political and economic motivations of 
state legislators and judges, management's potentially decisive role in 
takeover contests is evidence of an intellectual environment that re-
mains somewhat skeptical about the value of tender offers and their 
place in our contemporary commercial life. Greater appreciation for 
the broad effects of hostile takeovers on nonshareholders as well as 
shareholders has forced state legislators and judges to describe take-
overs as "corporate" rather than merely shareholder matters. Given 
172. See supra note 33. 
173. See Johnson, supra note 13, at 44-52 (discussing pre-Revlon Delaware common law fidu-
ciary duty cases). 
174. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985). 
175. See Johnson, supra note 13, at 52-61. 
176. See supra note 66. 
177. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
178. See, e.g., Gearhart Indus. v. Smith Intl., 741 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1984) (applying Texas 
law); Crouse-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1980) {applying New York 
law); Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying New Jersey law); 
Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310 (W.D. Mich. 1978) (applying Michigan law). 
One commentator has described the business judgment rule approach, as opposed to some other 
that might involve stricter judicial scrutiny, as "the apparent majority view." Steinberg, supra 
note 16, at 14. 
179. For the suggestion that preemption arguments being advanced with respect to state 
antitakeover statutes apply with equal force to state common law governing defensive measures, 
see Johnson & Millon, supra note 20. 
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the orthodox shareholder-centered rhetoric of the prevailing corpora-
tion law regime, that malleable, potentially all-inclusive reference to 
the "corporation" is the only acceptable manner in which to recognize 
these nontraditional but legitimate concerns. As a result, state law has 
placed target company management squarely between the bidder and 
shareholders and conferred on it a dazzling new power to influence 
and, sometimes at least, block hostile bids. This was not done simply 
because of political lackeyism, 180 or out of some imaginary desire to 
"compete" more effectively in the market for corporate charters. 
Rather, as a practical matter, after MITE, management was the only 
mechanism in the corporation law system that constitutionally had the 
power to take a broader view of the impact of takeovers on nonshare-
holders. Thus, the board's traditional duty to look after the interests 
of "the corporation and its shareholders"181 has become the legal 
foundation for the states' larger political and economic agendas. 
The result of these twin state law developments is a sharp depar-
ture from the Williams Act's shareholder-centered universe. By em-
phasizing the significance of tender offers to the corporate entity and 
its entire field of relationships, the states have inescapably and radi-
cally redefined the "internal" relationship between management and 
shareholders. As a result, Congress' original assumptions about both 
the target company management's limited role and the shareholders' 
decisive power in the tender offer process under state law no longer 
hold true. Now, though still enjoying the disclosure and procedural 
protections of the Williams Act, shareholders typically no longer pos-
sess the final, exclusive power to resolve takeover contests opposed by 
incumbent management. Thus, over the past two decades state corpo-
ration law has overtly extended the management-centered conception 
of the corporation that already dominated other spheres of corpora-
tion law into the last vestige of the traditional shareholder-oriented 
perspective - stock disposition decisions, including tender offer re-
sponses. In so doing, it has shifted the takeover balance of power from 
shareholders to management and brought capital market discipline of 
management within management's own control. In this important re-
spect takeover law joins the rest of contemporary corporation law. As 
these recent developments indicate, Congress adopted the Williams 
Act within the context of a very different state law regime. 
180. See supra note 8. 
181. See supra notes 81, 157. 
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2. State Regard for Nonshareholder Interests 
The continued rise in the incidence of hostile takeovers after pas-
sage of the Williams Act resulted in state efforts to curb takeover ac-
tivity .182 The primary impetus behind this development has been a 
legislative perception that hostile takeovers disrupt local economies 
and harm resident nonshareholders dependent on corporate activity 
- perceptions that increasingly are explicitly acknowledged in the 
language and legislative history of these recent statutes. 183 Even 
where legislators and statutes pay lip service to shareholder welfare 
goals, opposition to hostile takeovers is implicit in the design and 
likely effect of these statutes. This is particularly evident in business 
combination statutes and in expanded duty-of-care statutes that ex-
pressly authorize a board of directors to consider the effect of its deci-
sions on the corporate entity and various noninvestor interests, as well 
as on shareholders. 184 
A parallel development has been state common law rules that 
sanction management resistance to takeovers. These common law 
precepts do more than allow target company management to adopt 
defensive measures to protect the financial interests of shareholders. 
They also have been interpreted to allow target company directors to 
resist where necessary to protect the "corporation," including non-
shareholders, from the harsh effects of a takeover. State common law, 
in an apparent effort to restore shareholders to the preeminent place 
assigned them by economic and legal orthodoxy, may be in the process 
of requiring management to facilitate a tender off er regardless of its 
impact on nonshareholder interests. 185 But, to date, that principle has 
been confined to those circumstances where a "sale" of the company is 
conceded to be inevitable. 186 More generally applicable is a different 
rule, a rule that upholds the propriety of target company manage-
ment's attention to nonshareholders, or, put less strongly, sanctions 
considerable deviation from single-minded devotion to near-term 
shareholder interests. 
In the Unocal decision, 187 the Delaware Supreme Court specified 
the conditions that determine whether defensive tactics will be entitled 
to the protection of the business judgment rule. Among the require-
ments is the duty to evaluate the likely "effect on the corporate enter-
182. See supra note 3. 
183. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text. 
184. See supra notes 68-75 and accompanying text. 
185. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
186. See Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987). 
187. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
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prise," which includes the discretionary power to weigh "the impact 
on 'constituencies' other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, 
employees, ~nd perhaps even the community generally)."188 The Del-
aware Supreme Court, wrestling with the knotty issue of how broadly 
to read the Revlon auction mandate, has recently reiterated this princi-
ple.189 Courts applying the common law of other jurisdictions have 
also recognized, at least obliquely, the relevance of nonshareholder in-
terests in management's response to a hostile takeover.19° 
Shareholders stand to benefit immensely from unrestricted tender 
offer activity. State law that successfully restricts their opportunity to 
receive tender offers in order to further other policy objectives - spe-
cifically the protection of various nonshareholder interests - repre-
sents a profound departure from the orthodox principle of shareholder 
primacy as the principal focus of corporation law and the chief pur-
pose of corporate endeavor. Thus, in addition to altering the relation-
ship between target company management and shareholders since 
1968, the states have reranked the claims of shareholders and local 
nonshareholder interests. Again, Congress adopted the Williams Act 
within the context of a very different state law regime. 
3. Harmful Effects of Takeovers 
During its consideration and passage of the Williams Act, Con-
gress paid little attention to the possibility that hostile takeovers might 
seriously harm nonshareholder interests. Moreover, there was no au-
thoritative evidence as to whether takeovers truly served to reallocate 
resources to higher valued uses, a claim made then and now by their 
proponents. 
Today, the intellectual and political climate has changed radically. 
It is widely believed by state legislators and the general public that 
hostile takeovers bring plant closings or transfers, employee layoffs, 
lost tax revenues and charitable contributions from local firms, disrup-
tion of established supplier and customer ·relationships, and other 
vaguely articulated economic and social dislocations. 191 While the ac-
curacy of these perceptions is a matter of current dispute, they should 
not be dismissed out of hand. The character of the hostile takeover 
188. 493 A.2d at 955. 
189. Newmont, 535 A.2d at 1341-42. 
190. See, e.g., Herald Co. v. Seawell, 472 F.2d 1081, 1091 (10th Cir. 1972) (applying Colo-
rado law); Enterra Corp. v. SGS Assocs., 600 F. Supp. 678, 687 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (applying Penn-
sylvania law); GAF Corp. v. Union Carbide Corp., 624 F. Supp. 1016, 1019-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) 
(applying New York law). 
191. See supra notes 7-8. 
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has changed thoroughly since 1968. The dominant motive in the typi-
cal case is no longer to continue operations under more efficient man-
agement, or to generate other synergistic gains within a given 
corporate structure; instead, many takeovers are now driven by a de-
sire to realize the liquidation or "break-up" value of corporate assets 
in situations where the cost of target company stock is less than target 
company asset resale value.192 Even if corporate restructurings do not 
result in apocalyptic consequences for nonshareholders, they will often 
have significant disruptive effects on at least some established stake-
holder relationships and require costly readjustments. Indeed, it has 
been vigorously argued that the primary source of gain in the typical 
takeover is the acquirer's ability to appropriate nonshareholders' in-
vestments of human capital by inducing target company shareholders 
to breach implicit promises that stakeholders will have a continuing 
relationship with the target company. 193 Under this interpretation, 
takeover premiums represent wealth transfers from employees, suppli-
ers, and local communities to target company shareholders. Even if 
takeovers do serve society's interest in allocative efficiency, the benefits 
may not be realized in the states in which disbanded corporate opera-
tions were previously conducted. 
Debate about the extent to which nonshareholders suffer from 
takeovers will continue. So too will disagreement over the net benefits 
to shareholders and the extent of allocative efficiency gains and even as 
to the causes of takeovers. In the meantime, the states have made 
concern for nonshareholder interests the basic objective of their anti-
takeover legislation. They can be expected to maintain that course. 
That objective necessarily conflicts with shareholder interests and pos-
sibly even larger societal interests, and thus requires controversial 
"trade-off" judgments. States, for obvious political and economic rea-
sons, have struck the balance in favor of local nonshareholder interests 
at the expense of generally nonresident shareholders. Today, the as-
sumptions about the harmful effects of takeovers that compel these 
"trade-off" judgments raise important questions about the respective 
state and federal roles at the intersection of corporate and capital mar-
192. See Coffee, supra note 6, at 2-7. There is no agreement about the causes of asset under-
valuation or, more generally, bidder motivations. The question is an important one because 
whether takeovers should be encouraged or discouraged may depend on the answer. See Black, 
Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REV. 597 (1989); Kraakman, Taking Discounts 
Seriously: The Implications of "Discounted" Share Prices as an Acquisition Motive, 88 COL UM. L. 
REV. 891 (1988). 
193. A. SHLEIFER & L. SUMMERS, HOSTILE TAKEOVERS AS BREACHES OF TRUST (National 
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 2342, 1987). 
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ket matters. Such trade-off concerns were not part of Congress' think-
ing in 1968. 
B. Resolving the Preemption Controversy 
1. Shareholder Autonomy Versus Shareholder Protection 
As discussed above, 194 one aspect of today's preemption debate is 
the distinction between what we have called "shareholder autonomy" 
and "shareholder protection." This question has been formulated in 
terms of whether meaningful target company management involve-
ment in the tender offer process is a permissible means toward achieve-
ment of the shareholder welfare objective. A broader issue underlies 
this part of the debate, however. This is the question whether the Wil-
liams Act embodies a general federal policy mandating that state law 
promote the interests of shareholders in takeover contests (whether by 
autonomy or protection means). The debate has implicitly yielded an 
affirmative answer. We argue, in this section, that the Williams Act 
offers no basis for choosing between autonomy or protection and, in 
the following section, that there is no basis for reading into the Wil-
liams Act a federal policy against state law restrictions on tender offer 
opportunities. 
Judicial analysis has focused on whether the Williams Act allows 
states to establish procedures that assign management a significant de-
gree of responsibility for protecting shareholder welfare in takeovers, 
or, alternatively, whether shareholder welfare requires shareholder 
self-determination. When it comes to shareholder well-being, are 
states free to deploy management to serve shareholder interests, or 
must shareholders, for better or worse, enjoy the process value of au-
tonomy? This is how the Delaware and Wisconsin federal courts for-
mulated the preemption question, reaching, as we have seen, 195 
different conclusions. Presented in this manner, however, the question 
of legislative intent is meaningless. Congress adopted the Williams 
Act early in the life cycle of the current takeover wave, within the 
context of several basic, unspoken and now unfounded assumptions 
about state law and takeover practice.196 Thus, it assumed that share-
holders, not management, decide stock disposition matters and hence 
play a decisive role in resolving takeover contests. That assumption is 
no longer accurate. Through statutory and common law, states have 
empowered target company management to play a central role in the 
194. See supra section I.C.l. 
195. See supra section I.C.l. 
196. See supra section H.B. 
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takeover process. Was the Williams Act designed as a "shareholders' 
bill of rights" to receive and resolve tender offer opportunities, with 
that goal to be attained, if need be, by freezing takeover law and prac-
tice in its 1968 configuration? Or did Congress have the more modest 
aim of imposing limited investor-oriented requirements on the conduct 
of tender offers, while leaving states free to define their character in 
other ways? 
One might argue that, after all, federal securities regulation has 
traditionally limited its concerns to disclosure. It is unlikely that Con-
gress in 1968 would redefine the basic thrust of federal securities regu-
lation in the tender offer area, and substantially alter its relationship to 
state corporation law, by intruding upon traditional state law concerns 
in such a tacit and subtle, rather than express, fashion. Likewise, if 
Congress intended to proscribe any substantive state law interference 
with the tender offer process, one would expect a clear statement of 
that objective. Ultimately, these arguments about intent are mis-
guided because today's preemption question involves policy choices 
about the respective governance roles of directors and shareholders 
that Congress never addressed when it passed the Williams Act. To 
claim now that Congress decided the issue in 1968 is patently 
inaccurate. 
2. Shareholder Welfare Versus Nonshareholder Welfare 
There is a second, potentially much more important, dimension to 
the preemption controversy which the participants on both sides have 
largely overlooked. This is the relationship of the general shareholder 
welfare idea to the overall vitality of the market for corporate control. 
This issue was addressed forthrightly, though cryptically, by the 
MITE plurality, 197 and it resurfaced briefly but unsatisfactorily in 
CTS. 198 It troubled the Delaware and Wisconsin courts as well, and 
greatly influenced the timbre of their opinions. Does shareholder wel-
fare mean simply that, if and when a takeover opportunity presents 
itself, shareholders must be allowed to enjoy its rewards? Or, alterna-
tively, does federal policy have a more affirmative side, representing a 
coherent, comprehensive decision in favor of a robust takeover market 
unhampered by state regulation? The issue, in other words, is whether 
the Williams Act allows the states to impose restrictions on the tender 
offer process that have the effect of denying tender offer opportunities 
to shareholders. To put the question more firmly within the context of 
197. Edgar v. MITE Corp. 457 U.S. 624, 633-34 (1982). 
198. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69 (1987). 
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current antitakeover legislation, do the apparently straightforward 
goals and language of the Williams Act carry a latent meaning that 
requires shareholder interests to take precedence over competing non-
shareholder interests in hostile takeovers - that all takeover questions 
turn solely on the financial interests of shareholders? If not in the 
language itself, is such a meaning to be found in the structure of the 
Act, or perhaps in what Congress did not do? Or did Congress do 
very little and intend only as much, leaving room for the states to 
decide for themselves the circumstances under which shareholders 
would enjoy the benefits of tender offers? 
Choosing between these readings of the Williams Act involves 
more than a preference or distaste for takeovers and their economic 
and social outcomes. More deeply, it implicates the relationship be-
tween state corporation law and federal securities regulation. Corpo-
rate shareholders are and have been for many decades subjects of both 
regimes. They are the chief beneficiaries of federal securities laws. At 
the same time, they also are dependent on state corporation law for the 
very existence of their holdings, as well as for the definition and con-
tent of their stock's attributes. Accordingly, state efforts to deprive 
shareholders of the unilateral power to decide whether to tender their 
stock, by redefining the contours of share ownership, necessarily im-
plicate Congress' proper concern with the workings of national capital 
markets. Thus, on the one hand, it might be argued that in 1968 Con-
gress was determined to fulfill its goal of shareholder welfare through 
the medium of unfettered capital markets, regardless of whether that 
goal is of considerably less importance to state legislators. From this 
view, the federal shareholder welfare policy looks like a pervasive fed-
eral policy favoring takeovers, which are themselves taken as natural 
indicators of the healthy, well-functioning market Congress set out to 
achieve. Consequently, state law that reduces takeover activity ex 
ante by limiting shareholders' opportunities to sell stock to tender of-
ferers necessarily impinges on the vitality of the capital markets and 
thereby frustrates the purposes of federal regulation. The result is pre-
emption. This is how the SEC has approached the preemption ques-
tion, 199 and it was also the view of the MITE plurality and those 
scholars whose work is cited in that opinion. 200 
It might be countered that Congress simply intended the Williams 
199. See infra Part IV. 
200. See, e.g., Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, 
and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEXAS L. REv. l (1978). Scholars like Fischel, 
who prefer market mechanisms to legal regulation, are of course Manne's intellectual descend-
ants. Ironically, however, while Manne opposed the Williams Act, 20 years later and in the 
name of "investor protection," that very statute is seized upon as the vehicle for achieving what 
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Act to be an overlay· on the substantive rights state law provides to 
shareholders. State statutory and common law are presently in tur-
moil on the takeover issue, and there are signs that the two may be 
moving in opposite directions.201 Nevertheless, those laws and doc-
trines, with varying degrees of success, have generally been designed to 
empower management to preclude shareholder consideration of tender 
offers in many situations, harming shareholders as a result. The fact 
that the substantive rights of shareholders being tampered with in-
volve the right to sell stock is irrelevant, even though aspects of stock 
alienation are also subject to federal regulation. The shareholder un-
avoidably has become the point of intersection between state corpora-
tion law and federal securities law. Federal law, like a kind 
grandparent, confers benefits but makes few demands, while state law, 
like a parent, imposes stricter limits on share ownership rights. In any 
boundary dispute between federal securities and state corporation laws 
where a matter traditionally subject to state jurisdiction is at stake -
like the meaning of share ownership - federal law, being derivative 
and dependent on state law for the subject matter of its regulation, 
must yield in the absence of clear congressional intent. Thus, once the 
states have shaped the decisionmaking attributes of share ownership in 
the takeover setting, federal law will seek only to ensure that such 
transactions as do occur pursuant to the state law regime are entered 
into with adequate disclosure. But federal securities law itself makes 
no prior determination about what types of transactions should occur 
nor about their desired level of frequency. 
We have argued above that the claim that the Williams Act 
preempts management involvement in tender offers cannot be sup-
ported by resort to legislative intent. 202 Analysis of legislative intent 
also does not establish that the Williams Act's shareholder welfare fo-
cus carries with it a federal ban on state efforts to curb takeovers, such 
as those found in the burgeoning business combination statutes. Con-
gress had no reason to consider this question because, as we have 
seen, 203 under the then-existing state corporation law regime, neither 
management nor anyone else could place significant roadblocks in the 
way of tender offers. Congress' assumptions about the limited obsta-
cles in the path of hostile takeovers and the absence of significant 
trade-off concerns no longer apply. Thus, to make of the Williams Act 
Manne sought in denouncing the legislation - a vibrant, unencumbered market for corporate 
control. 
201. This idea is developed fully in Johnson, supra note 13. 
202. See supra section 111.B.1. 
203. See supra section 11.B. l. 
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a shareholders' "bill of rights" to receive tender offer opportunities is, 
at best, to argue that Congress' assumptions about the largely un-
restricted existence of tender offer opportunities for shareholders in 
1968 amounted to an intention to guarantee the continuance of such 
opportunities in the future. Yet one could just as well say that Con-
gress' assmµptions in 1968 about the states' primary role in structur-
ing corporate governance and defining the attributes of investment 
instruments and about the limited ambitions of federal securities law 
demonstrate an intention to allow broad regulatory authority for the 
states. The error in both sorts of argument is to try to read a particu-
lar statutory effort to address a particular problem as much more. 
Congress had no such intentions. Thus, the Williams Act offers no 
comfort to those who seek to use it to promote policies that Congress 
never endorsed. 
Like the language itself, the statute's legislative history indicates 
that neither Congress nor the SEC intended to take a position in favor 
of or against takeovers. 204 Instead, the Williams Act merely conferred 
on target company s]J.areholders some limited protections not previ-
ously available, while disclaiming any intent to strengthen or weaken 
the hands of bidders or their opponents. Whatever salutary benefits 
they provide to shareholders with respect to coercive takeover bids, 
present state law regimes, viewed ex ante, probably disserve sharehold-
ers by creating a chilling effect on tender offers, though how much so 
is unclear. Policy debate rages around the question of whether this is a 
good thing, and spills into and animates the preemption controversy, 
but Congress itself did not address that issue in the Williams Act and 
has yet to do so. 
IV. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT VERSUS CONGRESSIONAL 
ASSUMPTIONS, AND THE SEC's MISREADING OF THE 
WILLIAMS ACT 
The SEC, opposing the business combination statutes in its briefs, 
reads the Williams Act as mandating a shareholder autonomy policy, 
the essence of which is unimpaired shareholder decisionmaking, that 
precludes state law restraints on takeover activity. That is, to be 
meaningful, Congress' supposed commitment to shareholder auton-
omy must imply an essentially unrestricted right both to receive and 
respond to tender offer opportunities. In order to preserve the right to 
respond, such tender offers must not be channeled through third par-
ties, be they state bureaucrats or corporate directors. Consequently, 
204. See supra section II.A. 
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state takeover laws - "corporate" or otherwise - that obstruct 
shareholder consideration of hostile bids are preempted. 
In urging its views on preemption, the SEC seeks to achieve a par-
ticular policy objective, the removal of state law restraints on tender 
offer activity. The goal is thus a reading of the Williams Act as a 
protakeover statute, one reflecting an informed, considered congres-
sional judgment about the economic and social value of a market for 
corporate control unimpeded by state law - a policy judgment from 
which the states are powerless to dissent. The SEC's shareholder-au-
tonomy construction was heartily endorsed by the MITE plurality, 
which is not surprising given that the majority's commerce clause 
analysis in that opinion revealed the Court's naive acceptance of a very 
one-sided conception of the benefits of takeover activity.205 This read-
ing of the Williams Act also may have been tacitly assumed in CTS, 
even though under Indiana's statute shareholders as a body were em-
powered at the expense of individual autonomy, and even though Jus-
tice Powell did not overtly acknowledge the antitakeover bias of the 
statute. Finally, even the recent Delaware decisions upholding Dela-
ware's law, taking a cue from Justice Powell's opinion in CTS, seem to 
assume that the Williams Act sets an outer limit on the power of states 
to reduce the level of takeover activity, a limit that, if exceeded, will 
render the statutes invalid. The Supreme Court, however, has yet to 
endorse the SEC's claims. 
Since the states sought to "corporatize" tender offers after MITE, 
the strategic response of bidders and the SEC has been to view tender 
offers as securities transactions properly subject to federal regulation 
of capital markets. In essence, to the states' assertion that the tender 
offer "glass" is half-empty (and therefore a state corporate matter), the 
SEC responds that it is half-full (and therefore a federal securities mat-
ter). The opposing stances are matters of judgment and characteriza-
tion, not empirical fact. Tender offers simultaneously involve private 
securities transactions and significant corporate effects. Other sorts of 
corporate events share this dual aspect. Typically, state corporation 
law and federal securities law will regulate different features concur-
rently. For example, state law determines whether, when, where, and 
how annual directors' elections will be conducted, and whether voting 
may be by consent or proxy; federal law, recognizing the need for ade-
quate information in proxy solicitations, imposes certain disclosure ob-
ligations on the solicitor. The two regimes generally co-exist 
peacefully because of the dual citizenship conferred on shareholders 
-205. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 64344 (1982) (citing articles by Professors Easter-
brook and Fischel). 
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by state corporation and federal securities law. Certain features of a 
transaction are deemed "corporate" in nature and therefore subject to 
state law, while "securities" aspects receive federal attention. But to 
ask whether the transaction itself is a "corporate" or a "securities" 
transaction is pointless because it is often both at once. The key ques-
tion therefore concerns the terms of the balance that Congress sought 
to strike between state and federal tender offer regulation. 
The starting point for the SEC's preemption argument is the prop-
osition that the Williams Act was designed to assure shareholder au-
tonomy in tender offers-i.e., that shareholders rather than someone 
else (like management or a state agency) should decide a bid's success 
or failure. This is the position taken by the SEC in the MITE litiga-
tion and also in its more recent attacks on the "business combination" 
statutes. 206 Building from this premise, the SEC makes a further 
claim. It interprets the shareholder autonomy objective as signifying a 
congressional judgment in favor of unrestricted takeover activity.207 
The SEC's argument thus can be reduced to the following syllogism: 
Congress sought to protect shareholder autonomy (i.e., decisionmak-
ing) through the Williams Act; potent state laws interject target com-
pany management and limit the frequency of takeovers and thus deny 
to shareholders opportunities to receive and decide whether to accept 
tender offers; therefore, to make shareholder autonomy meaningful, 
the Williams Act preempts such laws. 20s 
To prove its claims, the SEC must first overcome a seemingly in-
surmountable hurdle. How could it be that the Williams Act's narrow 
disclosure and shareholder protection provisions209 actually state a 
general federal policy in favor of an unrestricted market for corporate 
206. See supra note 84. 
207. "The history of the Williams Act shows, in short, that Congress believed that tender 
offers could serve a useful purpose in promoting corporate efficiency .... The Act ... does not 
allow the states to rig the rules heavily in favor of one side or another in the contest, and to 
frustrate investor choice." Brief of the Securities & Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae, at 
22, RTE Corp. v. Mark IV Indus., No. 88-C-378 (E.D. Wis. 1988). Besides its misinterpretation 
of apparent shareholder autonomy language in the legislative history, the SEC also claims that 
"Congress explicitly found that 'takeover bids should not be discouraged because they serve a 
useful purpose in providing a check on entrenched but inefficient management.'" Id. at 18-19 
(citing SEN. REPORT, supra note 118, at 3). The full passage from which this quotation was 
taken reveals how seriously the SEC distorts the record. For the full quotation, see supra text 
accompanying note 127. See also HousE REPORT, supra note 127, at 2813 (identical language). 
In other words, far from making an "explicit finding" in favor of takeovers, Congress merely 
heard arguments on both sides of the question and then expressly declined to reach a conclusion 
one way or the other. 
208. The argument comes close to a claim that, in passing the Williams Act, Congress has 
"occupied the field,'' precluding state legislative activity. The Supreme Court has, at least im-
plicitly, rejected such an interpretation, however. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 631-
32 (1982) (" ... Congress did not explicitly prohibit states from regulating takeovers."). 
209. See supra section II.A. 
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control? Further, what about the apparently unambiguous evidence 
that Congress deliberately chose to take no position on the merits of 
hostile takeovers?210 The claim that texts (including, of course, stat-
utes) have no inherent, self-revelatory, or fixed meaning is fast achiev-
ing general acceptance even among lawyers.211 That is, the meaning 
of language is a matter of contingent social convention, and generally 
accepted definitions, while critical to communication, are nevertheless 
artificial and arbitrary (rather than essential and universal). A corol-
lary to this observation is that the meaning of words can and does 
change over time. What now appears to us to be the "plain meaning" 
of a literary text or statute may not have been plain to those who cre-
ated it. The question is a hermeneutical one: does one strive to divine 
the intentions of the text's writer, or is the reader free (or even obli-
gated) to bring a contemporary understanding to the text? 
Perhaps the SEC is claiming that legislators acting only twenty 
years ago used language in a manner that is no longer readily recog-
nizable - that the statute and the texts comprising its legislative his-
tory meant something very different than their apparently plain 
meaning today. The SEC makes no sustained effort to establish such a 
position. Instead, in essence, the SEC seems to adopt the "reader-
centered" approach to interpretation as its technique for construing 
the Williams Act. Thus, whatever may have been the statute's original 
meaning, to be useful in resolving today's problems the words must be 
understood in today's, not yesterday's, context. However, one does 
not read a legal text the way one reads a literary text, where one's 
response may be legitimate however distant from that intended by the 
author.212 Because legal activity is different from literary activity, one 
is not free to pour whatever meaning one wishes into the words of a 
statute as if into so many empty vessels.21 3 
210. See supra text accompanying notes 126-30. 
211. In addition to the proliferating law review literature, see the recent anthology INTER-
PRETING LAW AND LITERATURE: A HERMENEUTIC READER (S. Levinson & s. Mailloux eds. 
1988). Stanley Fish's writings on the understandings shared by "interpretive communities" as 
the source of textual meaning have been particularly influential in the "law and literature" move-
ment. See S. FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? (1980). 
212. See R. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE 209-68 (1988). 
213. In other words, it is incorrect to conclude that, because meaning is ultimately arbitrary, 
"anything goes" when one offers an interpretation of an old text. In interpreting the Williams 
Act, the SEC and everyone else must limit their efforts to whatever the statutory text meant to 
those who created it. The goal is to reconstruct the set of meanings - meanings of specific 
words as well as broader normative considerations - that informed the legislators' own use of 
language. Otherwise, one is likely to end up with a reading that has little or no relation to their 
thinking about what they were doing. The difference between the two approaches is whether or 
not the reader takes seriously the legislators' intentions. Robert Bork's reading of the Sherman 
Act as embodying a neoclassical efficiency policy (based on an economic theory that had not yet 
been invented when Congress enacted the law) is a classic example of misinterpretation through 
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Not only does the SEC disregard what Congress seems to have 
meant when it adopted the Williams Act, the SEC's approach to statu-
tory interpretation reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of the leg-
islative process. Statutory interpretation is not just a matter of 
reconstructing the general linguistic and ideological conventions that 
gave meaning to the language used by the legislators. Once one seeks 
to apply a statute to a concrete problem (like the preemption question 
at issue here) that the statute does not directly address, it is also neces-
sary to consider the purpose of the statute in relation to the circum-
stances under which it was enacted. All statutes are passed within a 
complex context of political, social, and economic beliefs and assump-
tions, as well as an existing legal regime, most of which is taken for 
granted most of the time. The legislators determine that a particular 
problem (or set of problems) requires redress. They seek to change 
some small part of the world in which they live, while continuing to 
take the rest of the context for granted and leaving it untouched. 
Words are the tools by which the objective is to be accomplished and 
of course we have to understand the meaning of the words to under-
stand the statutes. We need also, however, to understand what the 
legislators sought to change and what they were content to leave 
alone. In other words, the statutory language, which must be read in 
light of the general ideas that give it meaning, must also be analyzed in 
the context of the particular problem that the legislators sought to 
address.214 
Once we see this, important interpretive consequences follow. It 
seems fair to conclude that legislators are temporarily satisfied with 
(or at least indifferent toward) that part of the context left untouched 
by the statute in question. When deliberation is finished and action is 
taken to correct a particular problem through the legislative process, 
concern for how the statutory solution will affect other areas of social 
life plays a very limited role. Necessarily, little attention is paid to the 
relationship between the enacted statutory response and hypothetical 
developments that might present novel problems in the future. Cer-
tainly there is no warrant for concluding that, having attempted to 
make a small adjustment in the existing legal regime, the legislators 
also intended to preserve intact the background circumstances within 
which they acted; a particular legislative effort does not imply a desire 
disregard for context. See Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J. L. & 
ECON. 7 (1966). For a critique of Bork's analysis and an attempt at an accurate reading, see 
Millon, The Sherman Act and the Balance of Power, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1219 (1988). 
214. For a discussion of the need to read statutes in relation to the problem the legislators 
sought to address, see LaRue, Statutory Interpretation: Lord Coke Revisited, 48 U. Prrr. L. REV. 
733 (1987). 
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to suspend the larger context for all time. Efforts to impute views to 
the legislators about how they would have reacted to events that have 
occurred since passage of the statute are purely hypothetical and thus 
fictitious. In other words, it is an error to conclude that a statute 
aimed at a particular problem also had the broader aim of preserving 
features of the legislators' world that they took for granted and did not 
intend to alter by their activity.215 
Viewed in this light, it is apparent that the SEC's claims about the 
Williams Act's shareholder autonomy policy are based on nothing 
more than statements in the legislative history referring to target com-
pany shareholders' power to accept or reject tender offer bids.216 As 
argued above,217 these statements are mere acknowledgements that-
in 1968 - shareholders typically enjoyed the power to decide the fate 
of tender offers. The SEC's reading of the statute, and thus its pre-
emption argument, cannot be justified because Congress did not fore-
see or consider the possibility that state law might later empower 
target company management to protect shareholder (or non-
shareholder) interests. Accordingly, the Williams Act does not pre-
clude state legislation restricting shareholder autonomy. 
Like its initial premise about the Williams Act's endorsement of 
shareholder autonomy, the SEC's claim that the statute represents a 
congressional judgment in favor of unrestricted takeover activity is 
also incorrect. While one can insist that shareholder autonomy im-
plies a right to receive takeover bids, one can as readily respond that 
the autonomy norm applies only in situations in which state corpora-
tion law has made a prior determination to accord shareholders a role 
in responding to takeover bids. Consistent with the underlying philos-
ophy of the federal securities laws, the Williams Act requires only that 
if shareholders possess the power to decide who wins whatever con-
tests take place, they have the benefit of specified disclosure and proce-
dural safeguards. The disclosure system aims to provide prospective 
investors (or prospective "disinvestors") with sufficient information to 
make informed investment decisions. Necessarily, this regulatory 
scheme is an overlay on state law. That is, state law largely deter-
mines the substantive rights of the parties to securities transactions. 
The types and frequency of securities transactions are ultimately mat-
215. Another way to think about this is to distinguish between what the legislators did and 
did not do. We can infer that what they did in passing a particular law in some way reflects their 
intentions. However, what they did not do implies nothing about their intentions. What the 
legislators chose to do is law and policy; what they chose to ignore is not. 
· 216. See Brief of the SEC, supra note 207, at 19. 
217. See supra Part II.A. 
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ters for private decisionmaking within the legal structures established 
by state law. Again, reference to congressional intent offers no solu-
tion to this quandary because Congress passed the Williams Act at a 
time when there were no significant state law impediments to take-
overs. Naturally, Congress had no occasion to debate the merits of 
such laws or appropriate federal policy toward them. 
In the name of "investor protection," the SEC and other takeover 
proponents are now engaged in a campaign on behalf of hostile take-
over activity and, more subtly and enduringly, on behalf of a decisive 
federal role in displacing state law on the most divisive corporation 
law and policy issue in recent memory. The SEC - together with 
many scholars sharing the goal of market-driven solutions to corpora-
tion law problems - relies on familiar arguments. that tender offers 
are good, on balance, not only for target company and bidder share-
holders, but also for general economic prosperity; consequently, it 
seeks to facilitate increased numbers of tender offers. This campaign 
represents a departure from the traditional, disclosure-only philosophy 
of federal securities regulation. There is no basis for this remarkable 
development in the Williams Act or its legislative history.218 In 1968, 
it would have been unthinkable. 
The challenge now is to apply this old statute to new conditions 
and problems that Congress never anticipated. Unfortunately, what 
has passed for arguments about legislative intent have been nothing 
more than efforts to convert evidence about assumptions about the 
present into claims about intentions for the future. Such efforts are 
historically wrong and analytically unsound, yet arguments about the 
Williams Act's preemptive force ultimately reduce to claims such as 
these: (1) that because in 1968 shareholders, not management, typ~­
cally decided whether takeover bids should succeed, Congress in-
tended that should always be the case;· or (2) because in 1968 
nonshareholder interests could not be used to deny target shareholders 
the opportunity to receive tender offers, Congress intended they could 
never be so used. This form of argument reveals a basic misunder-
standing of the legislative process. 
There may or may not be wisdom in the policy preferences that 
218. While arguing against preemption, advocates ofa shareholder protection reading of the 
Williams Act seem to make the same error as the SEC. They begin from the premise that Con-
gress' shareholder welfare goal amounts to a protakeover policy, differing only on whether man-
agement may intervene for the good of shareholders. While such intervention may, on limited 
occasions, be genuinely beneficial for shareholders, their argument never rings quite true. There 
is a reluctance among these advocates to "come clean" and confess that the antitakeover statutes 
are not enacted with shareholders in mind. Instead they vainly strive to harmonize two quite 
different legal regimes: a federal regime with a limited purpose and a single constituency and a 
state regime with more complex goals and multiple constituencies. 
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underlie such claims. Our point is that those preferences have never 
been endorsed by Congress. As the nature of hostile takeovers has 
changed, so has thinking about the appropriate relationship between 
target company management and shareholders, and about the costs 
and benefits of takeover activity. ·These political questions should be 
debated candidly and on their merits, not according to whether they 
conform to some mythical legislative intent. 
The need to understand clearly what Congress did and did not do 
in the Williams Act is made painfully evident by a recent federal dis-
trict court decision upholding the Wisconsin Business Combination 
Act against a preemption challenge.219 The court began its preemp-
tion analysis with a brief description of the Williams Act's legislative 
history as recounted by the Supreme Court in Piper v. Chris-Craft In-
dustries. 22° Concluding that the sole purpose of the Williams Act was 
to ensure adequate disclosure to target company shareholders in a way 
that would not provide an informational advantage to either bidders 
or management, the Wisconsin court stated that other dimensions of 
the balance of power between bidders and target management can be 
regulated by state laws such as the Wisconsin antitakeover statute. 
Had the court stopped there, its preemption analysis, while quite 
brief, would have been clear and correct. As we have argued, the Wil-
liams Act is properly understood as a limited overlay on the structure 
of rights and duties established by state law. The court went on, how-
ever, to muddy the issue by trying to square the Wisconsin Act with 
what it perceived to be the preemption analysis of the MITE plurality 
and the CTS majority. Thus, it stated that the "fundamental question 
implicated by the Williams Act analysis in CTS and MITE is whether 
the Wisconsin Act impairs shareholder autonomy, providing manage-
ment with an an [undue] advantage that could hinder the share-
holder's exercise of an informed choice concerning the tender 
offer."221 Here, the court asserted that preservation of shareholder 
self-determination in resolving takeover contests is an important ele-
219. Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 708 F. Supp. 984 (E.D. Wis.), 
ajfd., 21 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 856 (7th Cir. 1989). This Article was completed before the 
court of appeals' opinion became available. Recently, in an oral opinion, Judge John Sprizzo, a 
federal district judge for the Southern District of New York, ruled that the New York business 
combination statute is not preempted by the Williams Act. Judge Sprizzo concluded that he saw 
"nothing in the statute or its legislative history to indicate that Congress had any concern with 
the decision-making process of the tender offeror to make or not to make a tender offer, even 
though the incidental effect of the statute ... may be to prevent a tender offer from being avail-
able to the shareholder in the first place." Vernitron Corp. v. Kollmorgen Corp., No. 89 Civ. 241 
(JES), 21 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 315 (1989). 
220. 708 F. Supp. at 998. 
221. 708 F. Supp. at 999. 
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ment of any statute passing preemption muster. In assessing the Wis-
consin Act against this standard, the court noted the statute's purpose 
is to deter takeovers but nevertheless states that "[t]he Act cannot rea-
sonably be said to impair shareholder decision-making in the tender 
offer process. The Act neither affects disclosure or timing, nor forbids 
tender offers themselves."222 
Not only does the court err in introducing a shareholder autonomy 
requirement into its preemption analysis (and in finding that the Wis-
consin Act satisfies that requirement), it also fails to see the inconsis-
tency between such a reading and its previous statement of the 
Williams Act's limited disclosure objective. What follows from these 
errors is a confusing amalgam of the various arguments for and 
against business combination statutes, all of which seems to boil down 
to a substantive determination about the Wisconsin statute's impact 
on shareholder well-being. Thus, recognizing that bidders might in 
fact fail to receive the board approval needed for a business combina-
tion under the Wisconsin Act, the Court responds that "[s]hareholders 
who feel the board is responding inappropriately to bidders maintain 
their power to effect changes in corporate control, thereby enhancing 
receptivity to offers."223 Continuing in this vein, the Court, while crit-
icizing the BNS court's "meaningful opportunity for success" standard 
as unworkable, states that "meaningful opportunity for success under 
the Wisconsin Act can be controlled by a shareholder vote in the light 
of board response to potential suitors."224 The reference here is to the 
shareholders' power to elect a new board if frustrated by the incum-
bent directors' rejection of a favorable bid. Reducing the question of 
shareholder autonomy to this issue then leads the Court to note that 
"foreclosing a proxy contest opportunity could frustrate or· even pre-
clude shareholder autonomy and the exercise of informed choice."225 
The Court then proceeds to a mysterious analysis of the effect of the 
Wisconsin Act on proxy contests, stating that question to be "a close 
one," but finding on balance that the statute does not preclude proxy 
contests. 226 If prevention of proxy contests is the standard, it is hard 
to imagine that any state antitakeover law could fail to pass constitu-
tional muster. Thus, despite its potentially fierce rhetoric (implying a 
federal ban on state impairment of shareholder autonomy), the court 
reduces the shareholder autonomy idea to a meek inquiry into whether 
222. 708 F. Supp. at 1000. 
223. 708 F. Supp. at 1001. 
224. 708 F. Supp. at 1001. 
225. 708 F. Supp. at 1002. 
226. 708 F. Supp. at 1002-03. 
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the statute eliminates the shareholders' already puny powers to elect a 
new board. 
Having set off down the shareholder-autonomy trail in its preemp-
tion analysis, the court adds to the confusion by periodically shifting 
into the shareholder-protection mode of analysis. It thus buttresses its 
holding against preemption by adding that the Wisconsin Act protects 
shareholders against coercive two-tier bids.227 Thus, the propriety of 
empowering the board of directors to protect shareholders against the 
coercion of certain kinds of tender offers is also made relevant to the 
preemption analysis, but without any explicit consideration of the po-
tential inconsistency between the shareholder protection and share-
holder autonomy standards. 
The district court's opinion in Amanda is thus a compendium of 
most of the arguments that have been mustered pro and con on the 
Williams Act preemption question. Under these approaches, the ques-
tion ends up being whether, on balance, shareholders come out better 
or worse off under the Wisconsin Act. While initially the court saw 
such a substantive inquiry as foreign to and no concern of the Wil-
liams Act because of Congress' deference to states' authority to regu-
late the balance of power among bidders, target company 
management, and shareholders, the beguiling rhetoric of the current 
preemption debate - both pro and con - proved irresistible to the 
court, which proceeded to address the issue in those misleading terms. 
The result is a preemption analysis bogged down in the workings and 
possible effects of the Wisconsin Act, made by a court that, at the 
same time, seems to sense both the irrelevance and the futility of its 
own protracted inquiry. What convincing resolution of the preemp-
tion issue requires now more than anything else is a court with the 
courage to refrain from the unnecessary and tiresome rehearsal of ar-
guments that wrongly dominate contemporary formulations of the 
preemp~ion question. 
CONCLUSION 
The preemption controversy deals with an issue that recurs with 
some frequency: whether state or federal law will govern a particular 
subject-here, hostile takeovers. In the abstract, of course, the ques-
tion has no necessary importance. What counts is the substance of 
law, not its source. In the reality of takeovers, however, it is crucially 
important whether the SEC and other proponents of Williams Act 
preemption succeed. Many preemption advocates have a particular 
227. 708 F. Supp. at 1000. 
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substantive agenda in mind. They are engaged in a crusade to create a 
robust market for corporate control unhindered by restrictive state 
laws, a market that is the centerpiece of a larger vision of corporate 
endeavor as the engine of economic efficiency, and corporation law the 
mechanism for achieving that goal. Accordingly, they - and, perhaps 
unwittingly, the SEC on their behalf - read the Williams Act as re-
quiring exclusive devotion to shareholder welfare, regardless of com-
peting nonshareholder claims on corporate activity. Furthermore,- in 
the takeover area at least, they conceive of shareholder welfare as a 
function of unfettered opportunity to receive and act on tender offers. 
Thus, we witness an effort to craft a federal law of corporate takeovers 
out of the Williams Act's relatively modest provisions. But the ulti- . 
mate aim of many is not to establish effective federal regulation of 
takeovers. Rather, the minimal requirements of existing federal law 
become the ideal vehicle, by virtue of the supremacy clause, for rid-
ding market phenomena such as takeovers of state interference, thus 
fully realizing their market-centered conception of corporate activity 
and law. Once that purpose is served, the minimal demands of federal 
law will not be expanded; far from it, they can instead be quietly aban-
doned, the states being denied the power to step into the breach. 
The jury is still out on such important questions as the net welfare 
and efficiency effects of takeovers and the extent to which they impose 
costs on nonshareholders. Furthermore, there is no consensus on the 
political question of whether states act apprppriately when they seek 
to protect local nonshareholder interests by denying typically nonresi-
dent shareholders the financial benefits of takeover activity. Indeed, 
that debate is barely underway, as judges, legislators,_ and commenta-
tors begin to acknowledge that shareholders are not the intended bene-
ficiaries of antitakeover laws. The full implications of that discussion 
for the deeper issue of corporate purpose and governance in our soci-
ety will unfold in the years to come. 
These are the fundamental empirical and theoretical questions that 
policy debates in this area necessarily presuppose. Lacking anything 
approaching certainty on these matters, it seems unduly hasty and im-
prudent to foreclose further inquiry. Yet, perhaps sensing a turning of 
the intellectual tide against them, that is the object that many propo-
nents of Williams Act-preemption seek to achieve. Not only does such 
a result seem ill-considered in light of current disagreements about 
facts and policy; it can only be based on a profoundly mistaken read-
ing of the Williams Act. 
